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Abstract 
From Gun to Briefcase: The Rise of the Private Military Firm 1990-2007 
Sean F. McCallum 
Scott G. Knowles Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an often-quoted statistic stating that in the Gulf War of 
1991, seen by some as the last hurrah of the cold war military, the ratio of 
active military personnel to contractors and civilians was approximately 
60 to 1.  The Iraq War of 2003 has seen near parity between contractors 
and the total number of troops deployed.  This number signifies a 
fundamental shift in military doctrine that bears examining.  Tasks once 
seen as the purview of militaries around the world have been outsourced 
to private interests such as Blackwater USA and DynCorp.  These firms all 
fall under the umbrella designation of the Private Military Firm (PMF).   
This thesis seeks to explain how these firms have achieved such 
critical roles in United States military operations since the Gulf war.  In 
doing so I will argue that militaries in the post cold war vacuum have 
sought to reduce size and increase efficiency through the outsourcing of 
core functions to privatized interests.  Due to a large industrial military 
infrastructure being in place since the end of World War II, the move of 
the military toward privatization of some functions is not unusual.  That a 
whole new industry has sprung up around the military with a minimum of 
public knowledge, while avoiding the derogatory “mercenary” label is 
unusual.  
vi
      This thesis will seek to answer three questions.   First, to whom do the 
PMFs answer?  For example, in April 2001, a single engine Cessna was 
shot down by the Peruvian Air force under the guidance of a surveillance 
plane operated by Aviation Development Corporation as part of American 
counter-narcotics operations in South America.  The plane contained a 
group of Baptist missionaries, of whom a mother and her daughter were 
killed.1  The CIA--for whom the contractors were working--claimed it was 
a matter for the company.  The company claimed it was carrying out its 
contract with the CIA; therefore, it would fall on the C.I.A.   
Second, is there a real cost benefit to using private forces to carry 
out the tasks once executed by national militaries?  In 2004 Tim Spicer, 
former head of the well known PMF Sandline Security, won a 
$293,000,000 contract for the newly minted AEGIS Defense Services Ltd. 
to provide security for multiple organizations and corporations currently 
active in the Iraq conflict.  This is the largest contract awarded to a non-US 
firm so far in the Iraq War.   
Finally, what is the role of technology in this burgeoning industry?  
For example the military theories of net-centric and 4th generation warfare 
incorporate technology as the basis for national strategy in the coming 
years.  These new military strategies will require not only  the classic 
military presence of “boots on the ground”,  but an extensive and complex  
communications and information relay system to fight a wars on not only 
the strategic front, but political and media fronts as well.  
                                                 
1 Jason Vest, “Drug War Inc.” In These Times, May 28, 2001. 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/1524/drug_war_inc/ (Accessed July 31, 2007).     
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To begin I will define the structure of the PMF.  In this section I 
hope to establish a vocabulary by which I can explain how the PMF has 
created a multi-tiered, multi service business that separates it from the 
mercenary.  The next section will be three case studies examining 
individual companies and what they have contributed to the debate using 
the three questions asked above.  Finally, I will divide this history into 3 
eras; The Gulf War, September 11, 2001, and finally the Afghan and Iraqi 
wars.  These four events have defined the development, explosive rise, and 
ultimate testing of the privatized military industry.
1 
 
Introduction 
In the course of the past 10 years a significant change has occurred within 
the military doctrine of the United States.  With the end of the cold war, 
the once significant standing military forces of the United States have been 
dramatically reduced in parallel with the reduced need for such massive 
capability.  As this capacity has been reduced the military’s reliance on 
outside contracting has increased.  
There is an often-quoted statistic stating that in the Gulf War of 
1991, seen by some as the last hurrah of the cold war military, the ratio of 
active military personnel to contractors and civilians was approximately 
60 to 1.  The Iraq War of 2003 has seen near parity between contractors 
and the total number of troops deployed.  This number signifies a 
fundamental shift in military doctrine that bears examining.  Tasks once 
seen as the purview of militaries around the world such as intelligence 
gathering, military advisement and training, and the security surrounding 
various strategic resources and persons have been outsourced to private 
interests such as Blackwater USA and DynCorp.  These firms all fall under 
the umbrella designation of the Private Military Firm (PMF).   
Security is a globally emerging marketplace.  PMFs are now global 
players operating in every corner of the planet, offering services once 
2thought to be the purview of the state,  namely direct and indirect 
intervention in regional conflict.  PMFs operate at many levels in the 
international security market in such areas as specialized training, 
logistical support, design and repair of sophisticated weapons and 
communications systems, construction of military facilities, and the 
education of the officer corps across the globe in small and large tactical 
and strategic operations.  This thesis seeks to explain how these firms have 
achieved such critical roles in United States military operations since the 
Gulf War.  In doing so I will argue that militaries in the post cold war 
vacuum have sought to reduce size and increase efficiency through the 
outsourcing of core functions to privatized interests.  This outsourcing has 
been a fairly recent process, the bulk of which followed the end of the Gulf 
War in 1992.  Due to a large industrial military infrastructure being in 
place since the end of World War II, the move of the military toward 
privatization of some functions is not unusual.  That a whole new industry 
has sprung up around the military with a minimum of public knowledge 
while also avoiding the derogatory “mercenary” label is unusual.   
As we move toward a more globalized system of cultural exchange 
and trade, we also lose some of the traditional ideas that go with the role of 
the state.  The role that PMFs fulfill in our modern global culture is one 
that existed for hundreds of years before the Treaty of Westphalia was 
signed in 1648.  Namely they provide military service without the need to 
have massive state forces.  The end of the cold war has also caused 
regional strife to explode in ethnic and ideological conflict.  Therefore the 
3services of the PMF are more in demand now than ever, and  shows  no 
sign of easing in the near future.  Cofer Black, the Vice Chairman of 
Blackwater USA and former coordinator of the State Department’s 
counter-terrorism policy, has claimed that his company could field a 
brigade size force--approximately 7, 000 to 10,000 soldiers--anywhere in 
the world with a minimum of time and cost.2  Such a claim is not an 
unreasonable one, as Blackwater’s corporate divisions include 
construction, intelligence, and airlift capabilities with an ever-expanding 
list of capabilities.  Also, the Private Military Contractor’s (PMCs) ability to 
be nimble and move around bureaucratic entanglements give it the ability 
to be in regions such as South America to aid in non-traditional struggles 
like the “War on Drugs.”   
The advantage the PMF has is of not working for a state, but for a 
“client.”  This business relationship removes the notion of government 
interference in another country’s affairs and places the yoke of 
responsibility on the shoulders of the contractors.  In looking at this 
advantage, it would be logical to assume that PMFs have created a solution 
that would be positive to all interests.  However, upon closer examination, 
several questions remain.  First, to whom do the PMFs answer?  For 
example, in April 2001, a single engine Cessna was shot down by the 
Peruvian Air force under the guidance of a surveillance plane operated by 
Aviation Development Corporation as part of American counter-narcotics 
operations in South America.  The plane contained a group of Baptist 
                                                 
2 Bill Sizemore, “Black water USA Says It Can Supply Forces For Conflict,” March 30, 2006. The Virginian-
Pilot, http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=102251&ran=202519 (accessed July 31, 2007)   
4missionaries, of whom a mother and her daughter were killed.3  The CIA--
for whom the contractors were working--claimed it was a matter for 
Aviation Development Corp.  ADC claimed it was carrying out its contract 
with the CIA;  therefore, it would fall on them.  In such a situation where 
does blame lie?   
Second, is there a real cost benefit --in both the economic and 
political sense-- to using private forces to carry out the tasks once executed 
by national militaries?  In 2004 Tim Spicer, former head of the well known 
PMF Sandline Security, won a $293,000,000 contract for the newly 
minted AEGIS Defense Services Ltd. to provide security for multiple 
organizations and corporations currently active in the Iraq conflict.  This is 
the largest contract awarded to a non-US firm so far in the Iraq War.  
Some say the contract was an appeasement of the British government who 
have stood by the US through the entire war yet have received minimal 
contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq.4   
 Finally, what is the role of technology in this burgeoning industry?  
For example the military theories of net-centric and 4th generation warfare 
incorporate technology as the basis for national strategy in the coming 
years.  Net-centric warfare theorizes that soldiers will become a node in a 
larger network. For example, satellites feed information to command and 
control centers which is then given to the soldiers in the field. Soldiers 
evaluate the information based on the current situation and respond back 
                                                 
3 Jason Vest, “Drug War Inc.” In These Times, May 28, 2001. 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/1524/drug_war_inc/ (Accessed July 31, 2007)  
4 Pratap Chatterjee. “Controversial Commando Wins Iraq Contract.” Corpwatch, June 9th, 2004, 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11350. (Accessed Sept. 6, 2006) 
5to command through same network, creating a near instantaneous battle-
space awareness at the tactical level.  4th generation warfare looks more at 
the strategic aspect of coming wars.  It sees the battle-space moving 
beyond theatrical conflict and into a decentralized form of war, blurring 
the lines between political and military operations by using psychological 
as well as military operations.    This new military strategy will require not 
only  the classic military presence of “boots on the ground”,  but an 
extensive and complex  communications and information relay system to 
fight a wars on not only the strategic front, but political and media fronts 
as well. The privatized military industry is already in an excellent position 
to offer many of these services and in many cases is already providing 
them to industry on a lesser scale as I will discuss in later a later section of 
the thesis.  
 Examining the burgeoning relationship between the state and 
industry will provide insight as to how international relationships have 
been altered in the world today.  Globalization of markets has included the 
globalization of security needs.  As these needs have grown formerly non-
state actors such as mercenaries have shed their image as freebooters and 
privateers and become acceptable surrogates for state-funded militaries.  
In this thesis I plan to investigate the  range of political, social, and 
cultural  factors that have changed between 1990 and 2006.  These 
changes have led to a rethinking of the ways that the US and many other 
nations are choosing to engage in conflict around the globe, with the result 
being the rise of the PMF.   At the broadest level, It is my hope that by 
6examining the issue of Private Military Firms and their meteoric rise to 
power, generalized trends will begin to present themselves and show how 
this relationship between the public and private sector is altering many of 
the norms we have come to accept as fundamental to the workings of 
statehood through the post cold war notion of reduced size and increased 
efficiency.     
To begin I will define the structure of the PMF.  In this section I 
hope to establish a vocabulary by which I can explain how the PMF has 
created a multi-tiered, multi service business that separates it from the 
mercenary.  The next section will be three case studies examining 
individual companies and what they have contributed to the debate using 
the three questions asked above.  Finally, I will divide this history into 3 
eras; The Gulf War, September 11, 2001, and finally the Afghan and Iraqi 
wars.  These four events have defined the development, explosive rise, and 
ultimate testing of the privatized military industry.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7Chapter 1, “From Gun to Briefcase:  Defining the Modern PMF.” 
This chapter will attempt to clarify what the PMF is and where it fits 
in the modern security business sector.  I will do so using the “Tip of the 
Spear” typology developed by Peter W. Singer.5  As they are extensions 
both of the state and for-profit corporations they do not easily fit into 
either the role of a public good or the private sector.  The typology’s 
importance lies in its ability to delineate between the PMF and all other 
militarized non-state actors such as mercenaries, terrorists, or guerillas.  
Examining the structure of these organizations carries the same value as 
looking at any other business flowchart that describes a specific sector’s 
specialization.  Specifically, defining terms and showing differences among 
these firms allows us to see how different business strategies and 
competencies allow PMF’s to reach multiple clients with their highly 
specialized products and services.  And in doing so, shows how the private 
military industry has evolved from it roots as shadowy and nefarious to 
accepted and legitimate.   
The Private Military Firm 
The use of the designation “Private Military Firm,” or PMF is generally 
seen as an umbrella term by which the whole of the private security 
industry can be addressed. I will first examine some of the typologies that 
have been proposed to classify the various branches of the PMF.   
                                                 
5 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 
2003)  
8First, there is the typology utilized by Thomas Keane describing 
three classifications of mercenaries: 
The first might be called the ‘traditional’ type, 
consisting of groups and individuals who have military skills 
directly applicable to combat or immediate combat 
support….The second type is a late 20th-century 
phenomenon: high-quality tactical, operational, and 
strategic advice for the structure, training, equipping, and 
employment of armed forces….The third type provides 
highly specialized services with a military application, but 
these groups are not in themselves notably military or 
paramilitary in organization or methods.6 
 
This was the earliest example of a classification developed to 
describe industry.  It lays out a basic framework for describing this 
industry but relies heavily on the use of the term “mercenary” in its 
description.  It is important to define what the term mercenary actually 
means in relation to both the soldier and the PMF.  The term mercenary 
has its origins in Middle English (1350-1400) from the corrupted Latin 
phrase mercenarius meaning “from wages.”  The modern definition of 
mercenary is a “professional soldier hired to serve in a foreign army.”7  
However when the word is used as an adjective it becomes something 
more pejorative, as the term is used to describe a person who works or acts 
simply in the interests of money.8  A soldier can be defined as a person 
                                                 
6 Thomas Keane, “ The New Mercenaries and The Privatization of Conflict,” Parameters, Summer 1999, 
pp.103-16,http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/adams.htm (accessed June 29, 
2007) 
7 Dictionary.com Unabridged (v1.1), “Mercenary” Random House Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mercenary  (accessed June 28, 2007)  
8 Ibid.  
9who serves in a state military organization.9  Finally, Peter W.  Singer 
defines the PMF as: “…Private business entities that deliver to consumers 
a wide spectrum of military and security services, once generally assumed 
to be exclusively inside the public context.”10   
As the PMF industry has grown in the past decade, so too has its 
legitimacy among states as international organizations (IO).  Therefore, in 
order to shed their previous image as adventurers and criminals bent on 
war for profit, they have legitimized their businesses by incorporating and 
creating regulatory organizations such as the International Peace 
Operations Association (IPOA) in America and the British Association of 
Private Security Companies (BAPSC) in the  
United Kingdom.  Both have a perceived ability to discipline errant 
companies.11  This ability to discipline is limited to removal from the 
organizations, which as has been seen in the case of Blackwater is not a 
major concern as they left the IPOA and formed the Blackwater Global 
Peace and Stability Operations Institute in the Fall of 2007 following  a 
major shooting  incident that  September.12  Several other organizations 
exist such as the Terrorism Research Institute, the Private Security 
Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI), and the International Association 
of Peace Keeping Training Centers (IAPTC).  These organizations create a 
                                                 
9 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. (2003) “Soldier. (n.d.)”   
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/soldier (accessed July 10, 2007) 
10 Corporate Warriors,  Pg 8  
11 International Peace Operations Association, “Standards & Laws”, http://tinyurl.com/2ou3jn (accessed 
Nov. 17, 2007) ; British Association of Private Security Companies, “Key Documents”, 
http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents.asp (accessed Nov. 16, 2007). 
12 Black water Global Peace and Stability Operations Institute, “About Us”, http://gpsoi.org/page3.html 
(accessed Nov. 16, 2007).   
10
web of interlocking interests covering many aspects of privatized security 
all over the globe.  However what they lack is a specific code of ethics.  
They act more as advocacy groups than as governing organizations like the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.  For example, on the 
IAPTC website’s overview, the following statement is made: “The IAPTC 
offers peacekeeping training centre personnel a forum for discussions 
relating to training without their having to deal with national interests 
(and sometimes restrictions).”13  This statement says much about the 
industry.  It says that these organizations to a certain extent seek to 
operate outside of state oversight in order to develop without interference.  
Why would a lack of national interests be so important to an industry that 
has claimed a deep desire for oversight?       
 So what is the hierarchy of military service?  The soldier sits at the 
top of the hierarchy in the modern world as they fight for nationalist 
reasons.  When a soldier is called to battle, they cannot decline because of 
economic or safety concerns.  It is, quite simply, their duty. The PMF falls 
in between the soldier and the mercenary as it is quite frequently a tool of 
the state in a way similar to the military, however, it is different in three 
ways.  First, it can also serve private interests such as a corporation 
without the problems of nationalism, meaning there is no impropriety 
when they work for industry.  Second it can decline to take on operations, 
as the only consequence will be loss of profit.  Third, PMFs are not meant 
                                                 
13 International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers, “Overview”, Pearson Peacekeeping 
Center,http://www.iaptc.org/about.html (accessed Nov. 17, 2007). 
11
as exclusively war fighting agents.  Their activities are diversified to 
include such tasks as logistics and training.  Finally, the mercenary sits at 
the bottom of the list.  The most widely accepted definition of the 
mercenary can be found in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), from  8 June 1977. 
 
Table 1 Singer’s PMFs and the Geneva Convention definition of a 
Mercenary 
 
Singer’s PMFs                                              Mercenary defined by Geneva Convention 
 
Organization: Prior 
corporate  structure 
Is specially recruited locally 
or abroad   
Motives: Business profit 
driven as opposed                  
to individual profit driven  
Does, in fact, take a direct 
part in the hostilities 
Open Market: Legal, public 
entities 
Is motivated to take part in 
the hostilities essentiall  by 
the desire for private gain 
Services: Wider range, 
varied clientele 
Is neither a national of a party 
to the conflict nor a                                  
resident of territory 
Recruitment: Public, 
specialized 
Is not a member of the armed 
forces of a party to the 
conflict 
Linkages: Ties to corporate 
holdings and                              
financial markets 
 
Has not been sent by a state 
which is not a party to the 
conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces. 
 
 
 
12
 It is within this table that one can find the reason PMFs and 
mercenaries can be seen as two separate entities.  Essentially it is the 
corporate nature of the PMF that separates it from the mercenary.14  PMFs 
operate, for the most part, in open arrangements with states and 
businesses using financial resources that can be taken from parent 
companies or borrowed through recognized institutions like banks.  Also 
the stable, long term structuring of the PMF is the antithesis of the 
standard fly-by-night operation of the mercenary.  As their legal status in 
many conflicts is questionable at best, their options to carry out tasks 
other than combat are limited by their own gray area of legal existence.  
Finally, payment can be accepted in a variety of sources such as interests 
in state owned companies like oil, diamond, or copper concessions.  The 
ability to be able to use concessions as a form of payment can be 
accomplished because of the corporate structure backing these 
organizations.  The flexibility is similar to a business that allows the use of 
credit cards to pay for products and services.  The more options a company 
is willing and able to accept as payment the more options a customer can 
flex to meet their needs while using their own resources.      
Deborah Avant, another scholar involved in the study of PMFs uses 
the term Private Security Company (PSC) to describe the industry as a 
whole:  
 
                                                 
14 Corporate Warriors , Pg. 64 
13
…I label these companies “private security companies” 
(PSCs) specifically because they provide a range of services, 
some of which are hard to categorize as military, per se.  15 
 
In her book, The Market for Force, Avant looks at PSCs from the 
perspective of the contracts they carry out as opposed to the firms 
themselves.  This fills in some of the gaps in Singer’s “Tip of the Spear” 
typology as it looks at the contractors as more than a single function 
company. Avant’s terminology gives the ability to look at several facets of 
PMFs’ operations as it does not rely  on the company itself to provide a 
definition, but the activities they carry out as well.16  In other words, their 
actions define them just as much as their being does.  Avant also makes 
allowances for paramilitary organizations such as police forces, creating a 
second category separate from the military to allow for the different 
functions which is something lacking in Singer’s.  A company such as 
DynCorp, with multiple divisions capable of several distinctly different 
operations at once, does not fall easily into any one category.  Avant’s 
typology does provide a more inclusive system by having the two separate 
classifications and using the contract as a method of understanding the 
role of the PMF, but I feel that Singer’s basic structure is more in tune with 
the analysis of this thesis.  While the use of a separate category for non-
                                                 
15 Deborah Avant. “Private Military Companies and the Future of War”, October 7, 2005. (Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA.)  
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200604.military.avant.privatemilitarycompanies.html (accessed August 8, 
2006).  
16 Deborah Avant, The Market For Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security . (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Publishing, 2005) pg. 17.   
14
military security provision is more over arching, the thrust of this thesis is 
looking at the industry itself as opposed to the methods by which the 
contracts are carried out.  Singer’s typology, therefore, allows me  to look 
specifically at the PMFs as a new entity and examine their place in global 
affairs.  There are three main categories within Singer’s “Tip of the Spear” 
typology.17  They are Military Support Firms (MSF), Military Consultant 
Firms (MCF), and finally Military Provider Firms (MPF).  Singer 
distinguishes each through the level of force employed and the range of 
services provided.  
Military Support Firms 
This is the single largest component in the typology.  This group 
encompasses the logistical aspect of the PMF puzzle.  This would seem to 
be the least “military”  like of all the classifications, however this branch 
holds the majority of the actors in the PMF field with  companies such as 
Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) Bechtel, Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC), Northrop Grumman, and Boeing  all 
falling under this rubric, making it a powerful one indeed.  Due to the size 
of this group further classification is needed to see the depth of the MSF 
category.  First there is the Military Contractor (MC).  This category 
encompasses corporations that develop military equipment and systems, 
and also repair said systems.  This is where the largest actors reside. 
                                                 
17 Corporate Warriors,  pg. 93  
15
According to a World Policy Institute report issued in March 2007 the 
rankings of Defense contractors’ stands as follows: 
Figure 1.2   Top 10 Defense contractors FY 2006 (in billions) 18 
 
Lockheed Martin  $26.6 
Boeing  $20.3 
Northrop Grumman   $16.6 
General Dynamics  $10.5 
Raytheon  $10.1 
Halliburton   $6.1 
L-3 Communications   $5.2 
BAE Systems   $4.7 
United Technologies   $4.5 
Science Applications International 
Corp.  
$3.2 
 
   
 
 
 
These numbers show that a staggering $107.8 billion dollars was awarded 
to these corporations to provide weapons and communications systems in 
2006, making them by far the largest sector of the PMF typology.  Previous 
to the drive for privatization in the military, these firms were seen as the 
traditional third point of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC).  Several 
of them have, however, diversified into other areas of privatized military 
operations.  For example L-3 communications purchased Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in July of 2000 for a 
                                                 
18 Frida Berrigan & William D. Hartung, “Top Pentagon Contractors FY 2006: Major Beneficiaries of the 
Bush Administrations Military Buildup”, March 2007,  World Policy Institute Special Report, World Policy 
Institute. http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/Top_100_Report.3.07.pdf (accessed July 7, 
2007).   
16
reported $40 million dollars.19  Northrop Grumman then purchased TRW, 
the parent company of the Vinnell Corporation, in 2002 for $3,533 
million.20   
This brings us to the support firm (SF).  The SF acts as the 
infrastructure for the military as caps for the number of soldiers involved 
in regions across the globe have been set by host nations.  Therefore, 
necessary functions of the military such as construction, transportation, 
food and laundry services, and mail delivery have been privatized to meet 
the caps, leaving the military to do what it does best: fight a war.  This 
includes companies such as Bechtel, KBR, and Halliburton.  This category 
also includes de-mining/explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) companies.  
Companies such as BACTEC International and RONCO provide this 
desperately needed service.  With an estimated 20 million landmines 
across the world, the business of landmine removal is, unfortunately, a 
lucrative one, with least 80 countries in the world with landmine 
“contamination.”21  The third and final leg of the triumvirate—and possibly 
most interesting of the three—is the intelligence provider (IP).  This 
branch of the MSF works in the shadowy market of photoreconnaissance, 
information warfare, psychological operations, and intelligence analysis.  
Companies such as Strategic Communications Labs, Stratfor, and Digital 
Globe all provide services once thought to be the absolute province of the 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 Global Security  “TRW”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/industry/trw.htm   
(accessed July 7, 2007). 
21. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Landmine monitor report, 2006” 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/ (accessed July 7, 2007).  
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state. 22  For example as part of Aegis’ $293 million dollar contract to act 
as coordinator for PMFs in Iraq, a daily intelligence meeting is held every 
morning at the Reconstruction Coordination Center in the Green Zone of 
Baghdad: 
Aegis's intelligence activities include battlefield threat 
assessments, the electronic tracking of thousands of private 
contractors on Iraq's dangerous roads, and community 
projects the company says are designed in part to win over 
‘hearts and minds.’23   
 
Aegis has begun to act as central intelligence gathering location in 
Iraq.  Their skills are no different than say the CIA’s intelligence network.  
However congressional concerns over a private (and  foreign) corporation 
handling sensitive and secret information have raised the question of how 
one can take what is a prima facie function of the state and hand it to a  
private entity?  When does this method of information gathering become a 
risk to the purchaser of the information?  
Another example of this market would be Strategic 
Communications Labs in London.  They operate as a psychological 
operations (psyops) for-hire company.  The company uses what it calls a 
“persuasion methodology” as opposed to traditional methods such as 
advertising to influence opinion.  SCL has worked with numerous 
                                                 
22 Sharon Wienberger, “You Can't Handle the Truth: PSY-OPS PROPAGANDA GOES MAINSTREAM.” 
Slate, Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126479/ (accessed July 7, 2007). ; Matt Bai, 
“Spooky” New York Times Magazine, April 20, 2003. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/897621/posts (accessed July 8, 2007). 
23 Steve Fainaru & Alex Klein.  “In Iraq, A Private Realm of Intelligence: Firm Extends US Government 
Reach” Washington Post.  July 1, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063001075.html (accessed August 1, 2007). 
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government agencies across the globe including police agencies and NGOs.  
As SCL states on their website: 
Broadly speaking, commercial communication is 
measured by attitudinal results (considering one brand 
better than another) and strategic communication is 
measured by results (votes, changes in health behaviour, 
troop surrenders). Strategic communication is particularly 
important in politics, military operations and humanitarian 
programmes, where the outcomes are often the difference 
between life and death.24  
 
The intelligence world stands outside the privatized military sector 
in that it carries out its activities outside of public scrutiny.  Functions 
such as propaganda, intelligence gathering, and intelligence assessment 
were at one point considered part of the national interest.  What will 
happen as this “sovereign service” is privatized and the information is 
disseminated by private entities?  IPs also stand out as a contributor to the 
technological and scientific aspects of the PMF.  They are the beneficiaries 
of the post cold war technology boom with the ability to provide open-
source intelligence gathering through the massive database that is the 
internet, photo-reconnaissance from the huge number of private imaging 
satellites in Earth’s orbit, and scientifically developed techniques of 
persuasion stemming from government-run programs and agencies. 25   
 
                                                 
24 Strategic Communications Labs Ltd.  “History” 2005,  http://www.scl.cc/about.php (accessed August 1, 
2007). 
25 Commander Randall G. Bowdish USN., “Information Age Psychological Operations”, Military Review, 
December 1998-February 1999.  Pgs. 28-36 http://www.c4i.org/bowdish.pdf (accessed Nov. 22, 2007). 
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Military Consulting Firm 
These firms provide all the expertise that a burgeoning military 
would need. Their primary difference with the Military Provider Firm 
(MPF) is that they do not engage in direct combat. Firms such as the 
Vinnell Corporation, Military Personnel Resources Inc., Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton, and ArmorGroup International are providers of  strategic and 
tactical training for large and small militaries, the creation of institutions 
such as officers schools and training facilities, and aid in the process of 
creating a military that is subservient to a democratic government. MPRI’s 
website states for example: 
MPRI pioneers new ways to serve our customers with 
products and services that support national security and 
organizational competence in the US and overseas in 
training, and education, homeland security, law 
enforcement, democracy transition, driver simulations, laser 
marksmanship, emergency management, leader 
development, organizational design and more.26 
 
 It is telling that two of the most recognized MCFs --Vinnell and MPRI-- 
have been purchased by larger more powerful companies like L-3 and 
Northrop Grumman.  This trend shows that these organizations have 
become valuable commodities in the higher echelons of the military 
contracting business due to their incredibly experienced staffs and ability 
to work within the Pentagon bureaucracy.  The argument has been put 
                                                 
26 Military Professional Resource Incorporated, “About Us”,   http://www.mpri.com/main/about.html, 
(accessed August 1, 2007). 
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forth that these are just “rolodex” businesses for these corporations due to 
the connections that a retiring general can bring to the table, commonly 
referred to as the “revolving door.”27  The most well known example of this 
being Vice President Cheney’s 1993  move from Secretary of defense to 
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Halliburton.  While it is impossible to 
say whether Halliburton directly benefited from this move, Cheney’s lack 
of experience in executive management--this was his first and only CEO 
position--requires asking the question of whether Vice President Cheney’s 
relationship with Halliburton has been completely severed.28  The 
argument has also been put forth that these companies are virtual 
branches of the state department that can be used to carry out US foreign 
policy without engaging the US in the process.  This means that so called 
“dirty wars” can be carried out with impunity as the soldiers in the conflict 
are not American soldiers, but company contractors.  Companies such as 
MPRI are in a unique position, as CEO and retired general Harry E. 
Soyster is famously quoted, saying “We’ve [MPRI] got more generals here 
per square foot than the Pentagon.”29  It would be hard not to correlate 
such a vast reserve of experience with a unique relationship to the 
Pentagon.    
                                                 
27 Open Secrets, “Revolving Door”, http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/ (accessed Aug. 19, 2007). This 
website provides detailed information on numerous government employees and their moves from public to 
private sector.    
28 The Raw Story, “Cheney’s Halliburton stock options rose 3,281% Last Year”, October 11, 2005.  
http://rawstory.com/news/2005/Cheneys_stock_options_rose_3281_last_1011.html (accessed August 2, 
2007); “Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) asserts that Cheney’s options – worth $214,498 last year- are now 
valued at more than $8,000,000. A former CEO of the gas and oil services juggernaut, Cheney has pledged 
to give the proceeds to charity” This figure constitutes a 3281% jump in value.  
29  Corporate Warriors,  pg. 119  
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Military Provider Firm 
 The category of MPF is the smallest and most controversial.  It is 
within the MPF classification where one would find what traditionally 
would be considered “mercenaries.”  This group can be divided into two 
categories: the Private Military Contractor (PMC), and the Private Security 
Contractor (PSC).  Operating at the very tip of the spear, PMCs provided 
highly skilled soldiers for direct conflict intervention, while PSCs provide 
the same level of skills for security and bodyguard work.  Firms such as 
Sandline and Executive Outcomes are part of the PMC designation, while 
Aegis Defence Services and Blackwater USA are members of the PSC 
designation.  Employees of these companies are former police and army 
special operations soldiers as their skills best match the requirements of 
the jobs.  However as the market has grown so to have the need to recruit 
from outside (read: non-western) militaries.  For example, the war in Iraq 
has caused a run on ex special operations soldiers, therefore Blackwater 
USA turned to Chile and its commando units to fill out its needs. This 
move created controversy as many of the commandos were part the 
Pinochet government’s military in which thousands of people were jailed, 
tortured, and disappeared.   This issue speaks to the problems facing the 
militaries of the world today.  Special operations forces are the Ph.D.s of 
soldiering.30  They are the most highly trained of all the military’s forces, 
                                                 
30United States Air Force, “USAF Para rescue”. http://www.pararescue.com/overview/ (accessed July 8, 
2007)   USAF Para- rescue trainees for example, attend 8 different schools over a seventeen month period to 
complete all of the training needed to be a Para-rescue man. While this is considered to be some of the 
toughest  training in the special operations community, it is not considered an unusual amount of time.   
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taking on average 5 to 6 years of training and schooling to reach full 
maturity in the United States. 31  The cost of all of this is borne by the 
government, therefore the taxpayer.32  As the MPF sector grows and 
salaries reach the 6 digit mark, the limited pool of these Ph.D. soldiers 
grows smaller and smaller leading to “brain drain.”  As of December 2003, 
measures have been taken by the military to remedy this situation, as  
Chris Spearin states: 
 
 
For approximately 7,000 operators of mid-level rank 
or higher, the plan increased monthly pay by $375 and for 
senior-level grades the monthly increase was $750. A select 
number of senior operators—1,500 individuals mostly at the 
rank of sergeant, petty officer, and warrant officer with a 
minimum 19 years of service—were entitled to sliding scale 
bonuses. These ranged from $18,000 for agreeing to two 
more years of service to $150,000 for six years.33 
 
 While many companies function on several levels (for example 
DynCorp offers services from Air fleet maintenance to private security 
details [PSD] for people such as Hamid Karzai) the typology allows for the 
analysis of each piece of the puzzle and its relation to the individual 
corporations and the industry as a  whole. This will be important as the 
thesis develops in order to analyze different sets of norms within the 
industry.     
                                                 
31 Christopher Spearin. “Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divide” 
Parameters, Winter 2006-7 pg. 58-70 http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06winter/spearin.htm (accessed July 13, 2007)  
32  Special Operations Forces,  pg. 64, the average cost of training a special ops soldier is between $350,000 
and $500,000.  
33 Ibid.  
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 The use and growth of the privatized military industry has 
established a post cold war industry of tremendous size and capacity.  It 
has established itself as a viable alternative to state forces and in some 
cases the only choice that developing nations can realistically make.   
 The Private Military Firm has moved from its shadowy beginnings 
as a taboo tool of statecraft into a legitimate form of sovereign transaction.  
In the era of post cold war hostilities the unbounded nature of 
globalization has created not only a market for goods and services of an 
economic nature, but of the provision of security as well.  First, the slowly 
coalescing organizational structure of this industry shows that as it 
organizes more and more, the easier such an industry will gain acceptance 
by the state.  Second, bodies such as the IPOA or the IAPTC can be seen as 
advocacy groups for the industry adding further legitimacy.  And finally, 
specific sectors of the industry provide goods and services in a contractual 
environment dispelling the singular guns-for-hire nature of previous 
incarnations of the PMF.  These three factors are redefining how the 
privatized military industry is viewed by legitimate governments as a 
means by which to carry out foreign--and in some cases domestic—policy.     
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Chapter Two, “Three Case Studies” 
In this section of the thesis I plan to take a look at one company in 
each of the general classifications I have listed in the previous chapter.  
For Military Service Firm I will be looking at DynCorp International, for 
Military Consulting Firm I will be examining the Vinnell Corporation, and 
finally for Military Provider Firm  I will be examining Black water USA.  By 
looking at the history of the companies, I hope to reveal answers to some 
of the questions that have been brought about by their inception and 
execution of their contracts.  By looking at these factors, a framework can 
be developed that will provide insight into how their operations are 
affecting global markets for violence and what roles the state is taking in 
this evolution.  
 
Military Service Firms: DynCorp 
The DynCorp website has a corporate profile that is used as 
shorthand to describe the company: 
 
       While we (DynCorp) are a highly successful provider of 
critical support to military and civilian government 
institutions, we also have important commercial business in 
aviation, infrastructure development, security, and logistics, 
including international projects to build and manage 
regional air facilities.34 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 DynCorp. “Corporate Profile” http://ir.dyn-intl.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194296&p=irol-irhome (accessed 
July 8, 2007).  
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What is stated in the above explanation is that there are very few 
situations in which DynCorp would not be an essential ally to the hiring 
entity, be it the state or transnational corporation.  DynCorp is a 
diversified corporation of staggering size and fiscal power.  They have 
divisions that carry out police force training in Iraq, act as the President of 
Afghanistan’s Private Security Detail, destroy poppy fields in the same 
country, destroy coca plants in South America, provide pilots and aircraft 
for counter-narco operations, along with a long list of other services.   They 
currently have 14, 600 employees in 33 countries.  They are contracted to 
work for the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Army, the Department of Defense 
and State, the State of California, the Kuwaiti Air Force, Drug Enforcement 
Agency, Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, FBI, CIA, and HUD to name a few with reported 
earnings as of March 3o, 2007 of $2,084,740,000 of which approximately 
98% comes from the US Government.35 This puts them at number 16 on 
the list of the most profitable companies in America.36  As a company, 
DynCorp is notoriously tight lipped about foreign contracts due to the 
proprietary nature of its businesses and the sensitivity of its work, however 
it does mention in its annual report a growing trend towards “outsourcing 
                                                 
34 DynCorp International, “Form 10K, DynCorp International LLC” Filed June 30, 2007(Period March 30, 
2007).   http://ir.dyn-intl.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194296&p=irol-sec (accessed July 8, 2007).  
35  Washington Post.com “Top 125 Companies”. 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/post200/2007/categories/top-125/ (accessed July 8, 2007). 
36 DynCorp International, “Form 10K, DynCorp International LLC” Filed June 30, 2007(Period March 30, 
2007)pg. 31   http://ir.dyn-intl.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=194296&p=irol-sec (accessed July 8, 2007).  
37  DynCorp, “A Brief History of DynCorp International.”,  http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=54 
(accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
26
particularly in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates” 
(emphasis added) indicating that perhaps they have looked to 
diversification into foreign markets as well. 37  
Their history begins in post World War II California when a small 
group of pilots came back to America with the idea of creating a 
maintenance company for aircraft.  Then in 1951 Land-Air Inc. was 
awarded its first government contract to provide mission support and 
depot-level repair to U.S. military aircraft and weapons systems 
worldwide, a contract that they still maintain today.  The year 1951 also 
saw Land-Air Inc. being purchased by California Eastern airlines.  This 
was followed a name change in 1962 to Dynalectron Corporation, and 
finally in 1987, Dynalectron changed its name to DynCorp.  DynCorp’s real 
introduction to the public came in 1995 with the awarding of the LOGCAP 
II contract for $210 million in Bosnia after having beat out Brown and 
Root Services (BRS). 38According to Peter W. Singer, “The exact reasons 
for BRS’s loss is not public, but rumor is that in attempting to add profits, 
BRS had not provided as competitive a bid as it could and DynCorp was 
able to underbid through extensive use of subcontractors.”39   
It was during the execution of this contract that DynCorp became 
embroiled in a massive scandal.  In April of 2001 Kathy Bolkovac, an 
American policewoman  serving as part of a UN police force contracted by 
DynCorp Aerospace in Aldershot, Great Britain, was fired  for allegedly 
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falsifying her time sheets after making claims that members of the 2,100 
strong international police force were trafficking in underage sex slaves.40  
 
In an email to more than 50 people - including 
Jacques Klein, the UN Secretary-General's special 
representative in Bosnia - Bolkovac described the plight of 
trafficked women and noted that UN police, Nato troops and 
international humanitarian employees were regular 
customers. It was shortly after this email went out that 
Bolkovac was reassigned.41 
 
Ben Johnston, an air mechanic at camp Comanche near Dubrave in Bosnia 
had also filed a complaint alleging members of his team were purchasing 
the passports of young women from the Bosnian mafia, in effect owning 
the women’s identity and ability to leave the country.  Emails sent by 
Johnston led to an inquiry whereby 5 men were first flown to a DynCorp 
office in Germany for interviews, fired, and sent home.42  However 
Johnston pressed the case as numerous incidents with other DynCorp 
employees went completely unnoticed. Then in June of 2000, Johnston 
was fired allegedly due to lack of experience in working with Blackhawk 
helicopters, a helicopter he worked on frequently during his enlistment in 
the Army.43  Both Johnston and Bolkovac sued DynCorp Aerospace under 
                                                 
40Antony Barnett, & Soloman Hughes. “DynCorp's British Subsidiary Sued in the UK British firm accused in 
UN 'sex scandal': International police in Bosnia face prostitution claims” The Observer,17th August 2001. 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/GUA108A.html (accessed July 8, 2007). 
41 Ibid.  
42 Robert Capps “ Outside the Law” Salon, June 26, 2002, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/index.html?pn=1(accessed July 8, 2007). 
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an English law known as the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998, a law 
made it illegal for a company to fire a whistleblower in the United 
Kingdom. 44   Both summarily won their cases.  
This however was not the end of their problems.  The Plan 
Colombia and Andean Initiative, formally announced by the US 
government on June 28, 2001, was a program designed to destroy coca 
crops in  Colombia and the surrounding nations.45  During that time 
DynCorp signed a $600 million contract with the State Department for 
coca fumigation operations in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.  In 2002 a 
lawsuit was brought against DynCorp by the International Labor Rights 
Fund representing some 10,000 people for $100 million for alleged 
fumigation of large tracts of Ecuadorian land having nothing to do with 
drug production. From the complaint: 
  
During the course of implementing this contract, 
Defendants also sprayed large sections of Ecuador that 
border with Colombia, and caused severe physical and 
mental damage to Plaintiffs, their children, and other 
similarly situated lawful residents of Ecuador who have 
nothing whatever to do with the production of illegal drugs 
in Colombia46 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Venancio Aguasanta Arias and Rosa Tanguila Andi vs. DynCorp., Case Number: 1:01CV01908 (RWR) 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/irlfdyncorp.htm (accessed July 8 , 2007). 
45 Ibid.  
 
46 Ibid.  
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Unfortunately the initial lawsuit itself was filed on September 11, 
2001, providing it little if any attention in the media. DynCorp, as part of 
its contract with the government, was given indemnity in the suit.  The 
claim has been re-filed in 4 separate suits, for unknown amounts.  The 
company is still under indemnity as part of its contract with the 
Department of State. 47  In the midst of all of these legal problems, 
DynCorp was purchased by Computer Science Corporation(CSC) in 
December of 2002 for $950 million dollars.48  With this merger, CSC 
placed itself deeper into the top 10 government contractors for 2003, 
emerging at number 5 with almost $1.9 billion dollars in federal money, 
placing it in competition with firms like IBM and EDS for government 
information technology contracts from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).  However DynCorp’s International unit (DynCorp 
International LLC, the division responsible for providing MSF services) 
along with several other units, was seen as incongruous with CSCs 
corporate vision and was sold to Veritas Capital, a private equity 
investment firm that deals primarily in military and defense,  in late  2004 
for $850 million dollars.49  In 2005, DynCorp International received on of 
their largest contracts to date from the Department of State’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)  to provide 
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
48 Erin Joyce . “Computer Sciences Acquires DynCorp” Internet News,  December 13, 2002. 
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/1556731 (accessed August 4, 2007). ; Computer 
Science Corp. 2005 Washington Post 200. Washington Post, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/business/post200/2005/CSC.html (accessed August 4, 2007). 
49 DynCorp,  “Veritas Capital acquires DynCorp International”  December 12, 2004. http://www.dyn-
intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=60 (accessed August 4, 2007) 
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training for Afghanistan and Iraq’s newly minted police forces. 50  The 
contract, known as Task Order 0338, was valued at up to  $290 million 
dollars for DynCorp, with $117 million dollars for the first year, and an 
optional two-year extension worth almost $188 million cumulatively. This 
was part of a $1.8 billion dollar International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs contract to train civilian police forces in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the largest ever such contract issued by the U.S.51   
 However, questions about the efficiency and capability to carry 
out the contract were raised relatively soon into its implementation.  In 
December of 2006, a New York Times article entitled  “The Reach of War: 
U.S. Report Finds Dismal Training Of Afghan Police,” talked about a joint 
Department of Defense/Department of State report indicating that 
DynCorp was unable to account for police vehicles and personnel.  The 
report also indicated that far fewer police were actually trained than were 
claimed due to conflicts between civilian government and DynCorp in 
executing the contract.  This, according to the report, was to be expected as 
Afghanistan is classified as a “failed state” due to constant conflict and 
pervasive corruption through out the past thirty years.52  The strength of 
DynCorp’s police mentor program (whereby retired senior police officers 
                                                 
50 Defense Industry Daily. “DynCorp Wins Up to $290M to Train Afghan Police Forces”, September 14, 
2005. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/dyncorp-wins-up-to-290m-to-train-afghan-police-forces-
01186/ (accessed August 4, 2007).  
51 Renee Merle,  “Coming Under Fire: DynCorp Defends its Work in Training Foreign Police Forces.” 
Washington Post, March 19, 2007, pg D01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/18/AR2007031801284.html (accessed August 4, 2007).  
52 Department of State/Defense Interagency Office of the Inspector General, Interagency Assessment of 
Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, Washington D.C., GPO,  December 12, 2006. 
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/D2006-DIP0E1-0193.pdf (accessed 
August 5, 2007). 
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from the U.S. advise Afghani police recruits throughout the training 
process)  is commended throughout the report, and has been shown to 
contribute to the readiness of the Afghan National Police (ANP).  However, 
as of 2006 there has been a boom within the country in opium 
manufacturing in Afghanistan with 92% of the world’s supply flowing out 
from it borders.  This is triple its output from the 1980’s and skyrocketed 
production from under 1000 metric tons in 2001 to over 6,000 metric tons 
in 2006. 53  In an article written by Imogen Foulkes for the BBC in July of 
2007 the issue of heroin production in Afghanistan is discussed.  Foulkes 
does not point to any specific reasoning for the sudden boost in 
production, however the lack of any central  authority in the failed state  of 
Afghanistan could easily be seen as a contributor to the strong recovery 
and subsequent robustness of the illicit industry.        
                                                 
53 Imogen Foulkes, “Afghan Opium Production Soars” BBC, June 25, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6239734.stm (accessed August 4, 2007) 
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Figure 2 Afghanistan National Police Budget/Capacity Projection 
 In a separate and much less congenial report entitled “Review Of 
DynCorp,LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030,Task Order 0338, 
For the Iraqi Police Training Program Support” issued in January of 2007, 
the Inspector General  of Iraqi Reconstruction looked at the International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs agency’s  inability to monitor 
inventories of equipment and vehicles, the construction of facilities that 
were never used, and the authorization of $4.2 million dollars worth of 
work that was authorized by the Iraqi government but  never contractually 
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authorized by the INL . 54  The money was to be spent on facilities in which 
to house the trainers in several cities in Iraq but have yet to be used 
despite spending upwards to $43 million dollars to create the temporary 
camps due to concerns about the location of the main camp at Adnan 
Palace in Baghdad and 5 other regional camps through out Iraq. 55  
The study of DynCorp demonstrates several key points of my larger 
argument. First who is accountable?  Second is there an economic and 
political benefit to using PMFs?  Third, how does the carrying out of these 
contracts contribute to the 4th generation/net-centric warfare model 
proposed by military theorists? As a model for the MSF, DynCorp is 
substantial. There is much about the organization that is unknown, due to 
its status as a primary contractor with the government and ability to 
declare contracts as classified due to security concerns or as proprietary 
knowledge to avoid letting other companies see the details.  Additionally, 
because DynCorp is a private entity as well as the nature of the services 
they provide,  Freedom of Information Act requests do not apply to their  
dealings with the government.  What role then does DynCorp play in the 
several incidents described above?  As they have been provided indemnity 
from prosecution, where does the responsibility for the acts committed 
fall?  The size and complexity of DynCorp’s operations in combination 
with its  ability to remain silent on much of its classified government work 
                                                 
54 The Office of the Inspector General of Iraqi Reconstruction. Review Of DynCorp,LLC, Contract Number 
S-LMAQM-04-C-0030,Task Order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program Support .DoS-OIG-
AUD/IQO-07-20. January 30, 2007.  pg. i-25, Washington D.C., GPO,  
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-016.pdf  (accessed July 13, 2007). 
55 Ibid.  
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provokes the need to ask at what point does the  legal aspects of 
corporations such as DynCorp merit the ability to commit such acts 
without  accountability.  Violation of citizens rights in host nations or 
inabilities to carry out major pieces of contracts due to the size and scope 
of contracts speaks to an overextension of corporate oversight of 
operations.  The provision of indemnity by the hiring entity--namely the 
U.S. government—gives a level of unaccountability that can be seen as 
overtly hostile to the interests of the host nations in that accountability is 
no longer an obviously answerable question.  Highly regulated 
organizations such as the U.S. military provide recourse in the case of such 
actions as there is a discernable chain of command to follow from point A 
to point B.  DynCorp is not obligated to provide such an option as it is 
hired by the state and therefore not of the state.  This gap in the legal 
system has made accountability untraceable back to the top.      
  Second, the contract was given to DynCorp, which in turn 
subcontracted it to Corporate Bank Financial Services of Washington DC 
for the planning and implementation of the contract.  Corporate Bank 
Financial Services  then contracted the construction of the facilities to 
Cogim SpA of Italy, a company known for their construction of pre-fab 
units. 56  Why would a contract such as task order 0038 need to be farmed 
out internationally?  Iraq’s state owned businesses could easily be put back 
into the hands of the Iraqis, while under temporary U.S. oversight,  and 
                                                 
56 Ibid.  
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contracted out to take care of the tasks described above.  They have, 
however, been left fallow due to de-Ba’athification (Ba’athists being the 
primary political party in Iraq at the time of the invasion)   policies 
introduced by Paul Bremer in the immediate aftermath of the war in 
2003.57  In essence Bremer’s policies cut the state industries off at the 
knees as many of them were run by Ba’athist party members.  This 
circumvention of the established infrastructure as the kick starter of 
industry in Iraq removes the states’ function as the primary negotiator for 
rebuilding the nation.  While it is understood that that their was an 
attempt by Bremer to attack the root issue of corruption by eliminating the 
former regime’s powerbase, this choice to privatize then brings into 
question the reasoning of the PCA’s choice to privatize the rebuilding of 
Iraq, The outsourcing of tasks seen as central to the reconstruction of Iraq 
both physically and economically does not provide Iraqis with the tools to 
develop their nation.  It does, however provide great financial incentive to 
the companies awarded the contracts.  Finally, the culture of military 
contracting is inherently based on conflict.  By making a living based in 
conflict, an aura of warmongering is sure to follow.  For example, 
DynCorp’s security forces have been called “thuggish and arrogant” by 
many including the U. S.  State department.58  The loss of the moral high 
ground due to thuggish behavior not only reflects poorly on the company’s 
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fulfilling the contracts, but places U.S. military personnel as greater risk.  
Part of the theory of  4th generation warfare is to use  the media as another 
weapon in a conflict.  So the acts of personal security details become 
reflective on the contracting entity, which is the U.S. thus leaving state 
forces to answer the angry reactions of citizens in the countries where that 
acts take place.     
Military Consulting Firm: Vinnell Corporation 
 The training of foreign militaries by the U.S. is a long honored 
tradition within the Pentagon.  The use of military advisors by the U.S. in 
developing countries has been seen in the past as a way to develop 
relationships between U.S. and foreign militaries and governments for 
many years.  These relationships are meant to foster armies that exist 
within the frame of a democratic society, meaning that militaries are 
subservient to the civilian governments that control them.  These actions 
have been carried out in general by U.S. Army Special Forces, known also 
as the “Green Berets,” due to their exclusive use of the Green Beret as 
standard headgear within the U.S. Army.  These soldiers were specially 
designated to train both established military forces in places such as South 
America and the Caribbean and an insurgency and counterinsurgency 
forces such as in Vietnam and Central America.  While this tradition of 
military diplomacy still stands, Military Consulting Firms (MCF) have 
begun to move into this market and with the events of September 11th, 
have begun to replace Special Forces as the primary educators of foreign 
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militaries.  In this section I will focus on the Vinnell Corporation and its 
history as a Military Consulting Firm.  I will examine their founding, the 
major role they have played in the Middle East, and what the implications 
are of privatizing such a vital role as military advisement while keeping an 
eye towards the three main arguments posited in the introduction.     
 The Vinnell Corporation has its origins in 1930’s California.  
Founded by A.S. Vinnell, the company began in the road paving industry.  
Because of its ability to handle large domestic contracts such as the Los 
Angeles freeway system and Dodger Stadium, Vinnell was able to make the 
transition from civilian to military contracting in the late 1940’s.  Vinnell’s 
first overseas contract was with the military to provide supplies to Chinese 
nationalist Chiang Kai-shek’s ill fated attempt to halt the spread of 
communism.  This contract opened the door for Vinnell to do construction 
of military bases and airfields across the globe in Okinawa, Thailand, 
Turkey,  and Vietnam.  It was with the Vietnam War that Vinnell truly 
became the global industrial power that it is today.  At one point, Vinnell 
ran hundreds of construction projects throughout Vietnam as well as 
repairs on weapons systems and running the military’s warehousing.  They 
reached their peak number of employees with 5,000 civilian personnel 
operating in country.59  In an interview with the Village Voice in 1975, a 
Pentagon official described Vinnell as “Our own little Mercenary Army.”60  
The official also indicated in the same interview “…we used them to do 
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things we either didn't have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of 
legal problems.”61  This quote speaks to Vinnell’s unusual relationship 
with the C.I.A.  Rumors abounded of Vinnell’s involvement with the C.I.A. 
as a front in several countries for C.I.A. operations as well as running 
several “black” or secret operations during the Vietnam War.62   However, 
with the end of the Vietnam War, Vinnell was on the edge of bankruptcy.  
It had thrown almost all of its resources behind the conflict and by 1975, 
was filing reorganization plans with the California Department of 
Corporations.63  In 1973, however, the US and Saudi Arabia signed an 
agreement to establish the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian 
National Guard Modernization Program [OPM-SANG].   The contract was 
won by Vinnell in 1975.  It was at this point that the firm was offered a $77 
million dollar contract to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), 
bringing it back from the brink of ruin.  This contract made Vinnell the 
first non-military American entity to provide training for a foreign power.  
Very little exists in the way of literature as to how Vinnell was able to the 
win the contract or why they were awarded it, but their relationship to the 
C.I.A. during the Vietnam war cannot be ruled out as a factor.  When the 
facts of this contract were revealed, congressional reaction was  fraught 
with the notion of mercenaries training the Saudis;  “Minnesota's Hubert 
Humphrey found the prospect ‘fraught with danger.’  Henry Jackson 
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declared that the notion ‘completely baffled’ him and demanded a Senate 
investigation.”64 As is quoted at the end of the Time article:                                                                  
 Said one former U.S. Army officer after signing on: ‘We are 
not mercenaries because we are not pulling the triggers; we 
train people to pull triggers.’ Another officer laughed and 
added: ‘Maybe that makes us executive mercenaries.’65 
  
 Vinnell helped to modernize the SANG at almost every level with 
each renewal of its contract. Starting with a complete modernization in 
1975, continuing with a renewal contract to develop the medical system for 
the SANG in 1981 while also developing schools for training, Vinnell has 
more or less built the SANG from the ground up.  These skills were put to 
the test in January of 1991 at the first battle of the Gulf War, known as 
Battle of Al Khajfi.  During this battle, Iraqi forces crossed the border 
between the two nations in a surprise maneuver and occupied the town of 
Al Khajfi.  The SANG are credited with the victory at Al Khajfi and with 
helping to rescue two Marine reconnaissance teams caught in the crossfire.  
It is interesting to note in regards to the Battle of Khjafi what one Vinnell 
contractor stated: “Lots of us were Special Forces, and I'd say that's a big 
reason why the National Guard did so well. . . .  In fact, when Iraq overran 
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Khafji early in the Gulf War, the SANG's King Abdul Aziz Brigade 
recaptured the town.”66     
  Upon examining the underlying context of Vinnell and the SANG, 
it is found that the SANG operate outside of the rest of the Saudi military.  
The SANG have been called “A sort of Praetorian guard for the House of 
Saud,”  by Jane’s Defence Weekly. 67  The structure of the Saudi military is 
laid out so that no entity within the structure can communicate efficiently 
with the other.  In one example, the regular Saudi Army and the SANG use 
two completely different communications systems, so that if one 
commander wants to talk to another, they literally must exchange 
handsets. This compartmentalizing of different sectors of the Saudi 
military stems from the Saud family’s fervent desire to squash any uprising 
before it occurs within the military or the civil population as a whole.68  
 In 1992, Vinnell was purchased by the BDM Corporation for an 
undisclosed amount.  BDM was already a part of the Carlyle group as of  
1990 with the $130 million dollar purchase of BDM by the group.69  The 
Carlyle group is a private equity firm representing an interesting group of 
people with high connections in the current administration.  Former CEO 
Frank Carlucci joined the company in 1989 after serving as Ronald 
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Reagan’s Secretary of Defense from 1987 to 1989.70  Former British Prime 
Minister John Major joined the group in 1997 after the British 
Conservative Party took heavy losses to the New Labor Party headed by 
Tony Blair.71  Former head of the CIA and the 41st US president, George 
H.W. Bush joined the group in 1993, after leaving the office of the 
president and becoming a senior advisor to the group.72  Carlyle was 
initially an investment group that work heavily in the aerospace and 
defense sector with such purchases as United Defense in 1997 for a 
reported $850 million dollars.73  In one key deal for Carlyle, Citicorp, the 
largest bank in America at the time, was facing financial ruin as the 
savings and loan scandals had taken a heavy toll on Wall Street. The bank 
was in desperate need of investment, and was contacted by Prince 
Alwaleed of royal Saudi family late in 1990 with an offer to buy $590 
million dollars worth of Citicorp’s sagging stock.  Due to concerns about 
such a huge foreign investment in the largest bank in America, the Carlyle 
group was called upon by Faissel Fahad, a San Francisco lawyer and the 
prince’s representative in the country, to negotiate the deal.  When the 
deal finally went through, the prince became one of the largest 
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shareholders in Citigroup, owning almost 9.9% of the common stock. It 
was after this deal that the Carlyle group and many of its subsidiaries such 
as BDM, Vinnell, and United Defense, made massive profits due to their 
collusion with the Saudi family to which Prince Alwaleed was seen as the 
facilitator of for many in the finance world, netting the Carlyle group and 
estimated $1.18 billion dollars between 1990 and 1998 when Carlyle sold 
BDM to TRW for $975 million dollars.74  It is a unique situation that an 
entity  such as the Carlyle group provide so many services to a particular 
nation and its people. Carlyle was, at the time of the Citicorp deal, the 
owner of the company that was providing training for the SANG as well as 
brokering a deal that bailed out the largest bank in America. In looking at 
this arrangement, it would be hard to discount the notion of quid pro quo.   
  On November 13, 1995, tragedy struck the offices of Vinnell/BDM 
in Riyadh.  A bomb was detonated in the parking lot adjacent to the 
headquarters of OPM-SANG.  Six were killed in the blast, five of them 
Vinnell employees.75  An organization named the Islamic Movement for 
Change took responsibility in the aftermath, espousing a doctrine of the 
removal of American forces from the holy land of Saudi Arabia.76  While 
this was a brutal crime against humanity, many in the military community 
saw this unfortunate incident as more of a matter “when” as opposed to 
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“if.”  As one retired military officers stated: “I don't think it was an 
accident that it was that office that got bombed. If you wanted to make a 
political statement about the Saudi regime you'd single out the National 
Guard, and if you wanted to make a statement about American 
involvement you'd pick the only American contractor involved in training 
the guard: Vinnell.”77 
 After September 11, 2001 the relationship between the US and the 
Saudis took a turn for the worse.  After it was made public that 15 of the 19 
hijackers were of Saudi descent, relations between the US and Saudi 
Arabia became strained.  Osama Bin Laden’s deep financial ties to the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network and former Saudi citizenship have led many in the 
press and public to question the Saudis indirect involvement in the 
terrorist acts of 9/11.78  While Bin Laden has expressed his desire to 
destroy America and the west while being seen as the linchpin in the Al-
Qaeda network, an act of terrorism committed on May 12th, 2003 shows 
Bin Laden’s hatred for the Saudi government is equally as venomous.  
Four separate bombs were detonated at the living quarters in Riyadh 
killing nine Vinnell employees.79  In a report issued by the Independent  
four days after the attack, former Vinnell trainers alleged that the SANG 
itself was responsible for the attack, claiming that elements of the guard 
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knew about the attack and provided assistance such as  detailed maps of 
the compound to Al-Qaeda.80  Lt. Colonel Raphael Maldonado was quoted 
in the article discussing a mysterious night maneuvers training session 
had been ordered by one of the upper echelon of the SANG where 50 
instructors were taken 40 miles from the compound, leaving only 20 
Vinnell trainers behind in a severely compromised defensive position.81  
The former trainers are planning a lawsuit against Vinnell to compensate 
for the medical costs incurred during the attack and supposed negligence 
on the part of Vinnell for ignoring warnings being issued about an 
imminent attack at the compound.  Vinnell claims that the facilities were 
“secure and hardened” but declined to elaborate any further. 82   
  After Vinnell’s decision to decline further elaboration on how the 
July 1, 2003 attack could have occurred a secured facility, they  were  
awarded a $48 million dollar one year contract in which they were to train 
and deploy 27 battalions or 40,000 men by June of 200483.  Vinnell used 
five subcontractors: Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Eagle Group 
International Inc., Omega Training Group, and Worldwide Language 
Resources Inc. to carry out the contract.  The goal of the training according 
to a work statement issued by Vinnell to the US Army was “a total of nine 
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truck-mobile infantry battalions will be trained in the first year with 1,000 
recruits trained in each battalion cohort."84   They were less than 
successful in the endeavor.  By December 12, 2003, 480 of the first 900 
graduates of the program had abandoned their posts. 85  Several reasons 
were given for the high drop out rate.  First the soldiers were paid $70 
dollars a month as compared to the $120 dollars a month that Iraqi police 
forces were being paid, plus the base of training was in Kir Kush, 
approximately 50 miles out side of Baghdad, requiring  trainees to leave 
their home areas. 86  Second, the training meted out to the soldiers was in 
the words of several of the recruits “egalitarian . . . making do without the 
formalities of "sir" and "ma'am" and saluting.”87  Major General Paul 
Eaton, part of the US army units being used to monitor the training of the 
soldiers put it simply: "Soldiers need to train soldiers. You can't ask a 
civilian to do a soldier's job."88  Third, a forced integration between all of 
the ethnic divisions in Iraq was created in the planning of the forces.  The 
first battalion was to consist of 60 percent Arab Shiite Muslim, 20 percent 
Arab Sunni, 10 percent Kurdish Sunni and 10 percent other.89  This 
resulted in language issues as instruction had to be translated from 
English to Arabic and then Kurdish as well ethnic tensions that had existed 
in Iraq for decades before the invasion.  It was eventually decided that the 
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civilian program should be ended and the US would take over, with the 
assistance of Jordanian forces.     
 The Vinnell Corporation has an extensive history with the US 
government.  Since the end of World War II, Vinnell has been involved in 
every major US conflict from Korea to present day Iraq.  It is with this 
name brand and willingness to go anywhere in the world that the US 
military will go that has made Vinnell part of the global elite in the 
privatized military world.  After TRW was purchased by Northrop 
Grumman in 2002  for a reported $7.8 billion dollars,  Vinnell was pushed 
into the top four  military contractors in 2006 behind Lockheed Martin( 
$36 billion), Boeing ($30.8 billion), and BAE($25 billion).90  While 
Northrop Grumman settled in at $23.6 billion dollars, Vinnell contributed 
substantially to Northrop Grumman’s Mission systems division.  While an 
exact figure was not available from Northrop Grumman’s 2006 annual 
report, one top 100 list placed Vinnell at #26 with $83.3 million dollars in 
contracts from the Department of Homeland Security. 91  
 The unusual aspect of this company is its size coupled with its 
ability to maintain an extremely low profile. Northrop Grumman 
corporate spokesperson Janis Lamar is quoted as saying “(Vinnell) has not 
                                                 
90Global security.org “ TRW” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/industry/trw.htm (accessed August 27, 
2007);  Defensenews.com,  “Defense News Top 100”. http://www.defensenews.com/index.php?S=07top100 
(accessed August 27, 2007)  
91 Jacob Goodwin. “GSN: Top 100 DHS Contractors.” Government Security News,  December 1, 2006 
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/special/top100_07.html (accessed August 27, 2007) 
47
done an interview in 30 years”.92  Vinnell has maintained this profile 
throughout its almost seven decades of existence. They are indeed an 
enigma. However in looking at news reports issued about the company 
and events surrounding employees and contracts, several questions 
surface using my initial 3 arguments.  
 First, does their  early  relationship to the C.I.A. and later 
relationship to the Carlyle group affect  their accountability ?  Rumors of 
Vinnell’s offices fronting for C.I.A. operations in Africa and Middle East 
abounded during the 1950s and 60s.  As this relationship has expanded, 
and Vinnell’s involvement with the C.I.A. has given Vinnell access to 
contracts such as the SANG deal, it would  seem that there accountability 
is a distant second to ability to produce.  One need only to look at the scant 
press that Vinnell has received throughout its existence and the extent of 
its dealing with the C.I.A. to see that oversight has not been a major 
consideration in its operations.  Second, has Vinnell been effective in 
promoting U.S. interests and have these interests contributed to the 
Global War on Terror?   It is ironic to consider that as Vinnell took the 
contract to train the SANG in 1975, echoes of Henry Kissinger’s thoughts 
on  a U.S. invasion of the Middle East made a few weeks before 
reverberated  through the press; "I am not saying that there is no 
circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in 
the case of a dispute over price, it's another where there's some actual 
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strangulation of the industrial world."93  In light of how Saudi Arabia has 
been portrayed as an allied power since the commencement of the 
contract, and as the two bombings described above were targeted 
specifically at Vinnell employees and succeeded in killing 14, how much 
does their being in the Muslim holy land bring to bear the resentment 
expressed in much of the vitriol of extremist Islam? As of April 2003 US 
forces, consisting mostly of Air Force detachments, moved from Prince 
Sultan Air Force base in Riyadh to the Al Udeid Air Base in the 
neighboring country of Qatar at the request of the Saudi government.94  
Citing Osama Bin Laden’s grievance with U.S. presence in the holy land of 
Saudi Arabia; “In January 2002, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card 
told CNN that Saudi officials had asked the United States to reduce its 
military presence there.  ‘I think it's in the long-term interest of both 
countries,’ Card said.”95  And finally what has Vinnell’s contribution been 
to the technological aspect of the PMF? As notions of war have changed, 
the use of technology has become as prevalent as to be ubiquitous.  
Improvised explosive devices—or as they are more commonly known, 
IEDs— are made with a remote cell phone detonator and a coffee can 
packed with nails and explosives.  1666 of the 3871 reported as of 
November 18, 2007 have been the result of these weapons. 96  Such 
statistics indicate that as U.S. military technology is introduced, insurgents 
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respond in kind with a rapidity that coalition troops cannot keep up with. 
What we do have as an essential part of our arsenal is training. U.S. forces 
are amongst the most highly trained in the world.  Technology is easily 
reproducible and alterable to suits the needs of the user. Teaching 
someone how to use the technology as effectively as possible is not as easy.  
The example of Vinnell’s complete flubbing of the training of Iraqi forces 
shows that the short-term efficient solution of outsourcing of training can 
have disastrous long term consequences as U.S. soldiers were removed 
from the front lines to provide the training.  Had this been considered in 
the post-war rebuilding as part of the total force, it may have taken away 
from fighting capacity in the short term, but would  provided Iraqi soldiers 
to fight the Iraqi war in the long term.       
 
 
 
Military Provider Firm: Blackwater 
The MPF is the most high profile of all the PMFs because of its use of force 
as a part of its operating procedure, making it the tip of the spear.  Their 
ranks are filled by the elite units of the world’s militaries such as the 
Special Air Service of Great Britain, Delta Force in the United States, and 
the Spetsnaz of the Russian Confederation, as well as special weapons and 
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tactics (SWAT) police units from around the globe.  Their primary 
missions are security and direct intervention.   In the United States, the 
most well recognized of these companies is Blackwater USA. Founded in 
1997 by former Navy Seal Erik Prince, Blackwater provides security across 
a wide range of both government agencies and corporate endeavors.  Their 
involvement in so many sectors has given them a distinct advantage in the 
MPF field, having snagged some of the earliest contracts in the war and 
being given the premier task of security for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) and Paul Bremer in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq 
war.  Also included in their rise to predominance in the MPF sector is the 
hiring of J. Cofer Black, the former head of the CIA’s counterterrorism 
department and rumored prime mover behind the extraordinary rendition 
program carried out by the United States, of which Presidential Airways , a 
division of Blackwater USA, provided some of  the air services.97  With 
such highly placed, well connected employees and important missions it is 
little wonder that Blackwater’s reported $320 million dollars in contracts 
are predicted by analysts to only rise.   
 In 1996 Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, left the Navy 
SEALS due to the death of his father, Edgar Prince, in 1995  and the 
worsening health of his wife who had been stricken with cancer.  It was in 
this year that the Prince family sold the Prince Corporation which had 
been started by  Edgar in 1965.  What had begun as a small die casting 
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shop for the automotive industry in Holland, Michigan turned into a 
monolithic organization in the town, employing more than 4,000 people 
and doing more than $400 million dollars in sales in 1995.98  It was with 
the sale of the Prince Corporation for approximately half a billion dollars 
in 1996 that Erik became a wealthy man in his own right.99   
 Much has been made of Prince’s association with various political 
and religious organizations.  Prince is a man of deep religious conviction 
and used the wealth he had generated from the sale of the Prince 
Corporation to fund many conservative causes, such as the Michigan 
Family Forum, the Michigan state chapter of Focus on the Family.100  
After the marriage of Erik’s sister Betsy to Dick DeVos (the 2006 
contender for governor of Michigan) in the 1980’s one of the most 
powerful conservative families in the country was born.  The DeVos family 
fortune came from the creation of Amway, the world’s largest multi-level 
marketing firm with offices in 80 countries.  Erik himself served as an 
intern in the first Bush administration but complained that the 
administration was not conservative enough, citing meetings with 
homosexual advocacy groups, the Clean Air Act, and the budget agreement 
as “not addressing a lot of conservative concerns.”101  Prince was also a 
backer of Pat Buchanan’s presidential campaign in 1992, working as a 
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campaign coordinator at Hillsdale College, where Erik graduated from 
after leaving the Naval Academy several years before.       
  Prince partnered with a former instructor from his Navy SEAL 
days named Al Clark to form the Blackwater Lodge and Training center.  
The timing of this incorporation could not have been more fortuitous for 
Prince and Clark, as the Base Realignment and Closure Act was in full 
swing in the late 1980’s and early 90’s  and facilities for training elite units 
such as the Navy SEALs were in great demand.102  As quoted from the 
Blackwater website: “Our founder is a former U. S. Navy SEAL. He created 
Blackwater on the belief that both the military and law enforcement 
establishments would require additional capacity to train fully our brave 
men and women in and out of uniform to the standards required to keep 
our country secure.”103  While this statement rings a bit jingoistic, it 
reveals a shrewd model for business with government entities such as the 
police and military.  Prince and his cohorts were aware of a need within 
the law enforcement and special operations community for high end 
training facilities as many were either antiquated—some dating back to 
World War II—or were being closed all together.  They fulfilled this need 
with the purchase of 5,000 acres in North Carolina near the Great Dismal 
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Swamp.104  It is claimed by Blackwater to be the largest such privately 
owned facility in America with several shooting ranges, large scale indoor 
and outdoor live fire “shoot houses”--meaning the buildings and 
surrounding area have been constructed to allow for live fire training-- 
urban reproductions, a man-made lake, and a driving track.105   With its 
professional well laid out facilities and experienced training staff, 
Blackwater lodge rapidly became a premiere training facility for military 
and police units from around the world, with police officers from Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Canada all leasing out Blackwater’s facilities.  For 
example, in September of 1999 Blackwater completed the construction of 
“R U Ready High School,” a 15 room, 14,746 square foot simulator 
designed to emulate a typical American high school in anticipation of more 
“Columbine” style massacres.  One article discusses the realistic 
simulation: “Loudspeakers blare the sounds of automatic gunfire, 
explosions and fire alarms. Actors playing children scream.  Sprinklers 
shower the halls and classrooms.  Smoke clouds the building.”106  The 
facility’s size and realism brought SWAT teams from across the country to 
train. The training site so peaked the interest of the National Tactical 
Officers Association (NTOA) that they put $50,000 toward the 
construction and convinced the NTOA to hold its 16th annual conference at 
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both Virginia Beach and the Blackwater facilities.107 The event brought 
police from every state and dozens of countries to the facility putting the 
Blackwater name at the forefront of the training facility market.  
  In 2000 Blackwater received its first General Service 
Administration (GSA) schedule.108  By receiving this schedule, Blackwater 
was now open to what are called “long term government wide contracts” 
meaning that their services and products such as the Blackwater Targeting 
System were now officially available to government agencies.  This led to a 
first contract worth  $68,000 to provide “armament training devices” such 
as the targeting system developed by Blackwater.109  However, the true 
kickoff to Blackwater’s government contracting would begin with the 
tragic events on the USS Cole in October of 2000.  Osama Bin Laden took 
credit for the suicide attack that killed 17 sailors and injured 39 others on 
the morning of October 12th in the port city of Aden, Yemen.  The result of 
this attack was a contract worth $35.7 million dollars to conduct “force 
protection” training.110  Traditionally, sailors did not train for combat.  
However as the threat of terrorist activity loomed larger the navy began 
work on a plan to provide the training needed for such eventualities.  Anti-
terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) as it is called is defined as “efforts 
include training and deployment of AT/FP personnel; Navy contributions 
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to programs relating to weapons of mass destruction; enhanced shipboard, 
port, and facilities defenses; and physical security equipment, weapons, 
and ammunition . . . .” 111  
 The events of September 11th shook the U.S. government to its 
core.  A recognition of the United States’ vulnerability as a nation came to 
the forefront of political decision making and as such led to looking at as 
many sources of security training as possible.  Erik Prince appeared on the 
O’Reilly Factor on September 27, 2001, 16 days after the events of 
September 11th.  He was quoted as saying: “I’ve been operating in the 
security business for 4 years and was starting to get a little cynical on how 
seriously people took security . . .   The phone is now ringing off the 
hook.”112  September the 11th was the beginning of a relationship between 
the U.S. government and  Blackwater that has made it one of the most 
successful of the MPFs involved in the Global War on Terror (GWoT).  
This success has been based in large part on the creation of one division 
with the company, Blackwater Security Consulting. With its incorporation 
in Delaware in January of 2002, Blackwater was able to obtain valuable 
C.I.A. contracts to provide security at C.I.A. posts throughout the world.113  
Prince had the help of two people in the creation and marketing of this 
division of the company, by the way of Jamie Smith, a former C.I.A. 
                                                 
111 Ronald O’Rouke, Homeland Security Naval Operations; Background and Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 2, 2005, pg. 5, Washington D.C. GPO, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/homeland_security.htm (accessed July 16, 2007)   
112 Erik Prince on The O’Reilly Factor, The Fox Network,  September 27, 2001  
113 Robert Young Pelton. “Licensed to Kill: Hired guns in the War on Terror” (Random House: New York, 
2006) pgs. 36-41 
56
operative during Gulf War and Buzzy Krongard, a special advisor to the 
Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet.  Krongard’s relationship to 
the Prince family extends far beyond this initial relationship due to 
Krongard’s past as an investment banker with the firm Alex. Brown. 114  
Krongard joined the C.I.A. in 1998 after parlaying his former firm into one 
of the most successful in the country and selling it to Banker’s Trust in 
1997.115  It was at this point in the Afghan war that the C.I.A. security 
division, known as the Global Response Staff, recognized itself as stretched 
beyond its capacity to provide protection for all of its operations in 
Afghanistan.  The small company owned by Erik Prince was first tapped to 
provide a 20 man team for security at the Kabul station of the C.I.A.  
Prince’s connections within the C.I.A. helped to secure an initial contract, 
known as an “urgent and compelling” contract, eliminating the need for a 
competitive bidding process, worth $5.4 million dollars for a six-month 
period.  In estimating the costs of the contracts, Jamie Smith, who had 
become Prince’s right hand man, looked at DynCorp’s contracts, another 
company that had provided security at C.I.A. station houses, to create an 
estimate of $550.00 dollars a day per contractor.  However Blackwater 
itself would bill the C.I.A. at a rate of $1,500 dollars per day.  As is noted in 
Robert Young Pelton’s book License to Kill, each of the contractors earned 
$18,500 a month, while Blackwater itself cleared over $900,000 a month.  
This contract led to a windfall of business for Blackwater with Prince 
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becoming what is referred to in the C.I.A. as a “blue badger” or contractor 
for the C.I.A.  Along with monthly meetings at Langley, the relationship 
became even more closely knit as the flow of “black” contracts—or C.I.A. 
contracts for classified services and products--reached an approximate 
15% of Blackwater’s business.116  Prince was so taken with the notion of 
working with the C.I.A. in secretive operations that both he and Smith 
joined the 20 man security team at the furthest reaches of U.S. influence in 
Afghanistan in a firebase located 4 miles from Pakistan in a place called 
Shkin known to some as “Fort Apache.”117  It was within this base that 
elements of Task Force 11 resided.  This group of Rangers, Special Forces, 
British SAS, Elements of Air Force special operations, and some members 
of the ultra- secretive Army Delta Force carried out the task of hunting 
high valued targets such as Bin Laden from this remote outpost while 
Blackwater provided security.  Young claims the base was “subject to 
regular attacks from enemies who would strike and flee back across the 
border into Pakistan” indicating that the contractors were more than likely 
involved in combat situations. 118  Smith stayed at the base for the two 
month duration of the contract in Shkin while Prince stayed for only a 
week, needing to go back and make more contracts happen for the 
company.  
 On March 20, 2003 after months of debate and posturing, the 
United States invaded Iraq.  The war itself was swift and decisive in favor 
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of the coalition forces.  In the aftermath of the conflict the process of 
rebuilding the nation fell to Jay Garner for a short time, and was then 
passed to Paul Bremer who became the Director of the Office for 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority of Iraq.  Bremer was a controversial figure with an extreme free 
market outlook on the nation of Iraq.  This outlook did not win him favor 
amongst the Iraqi people as Bremer essentially stripped the Iraqi nation of 
control over its industry and placed those industries on the market. 
Following Bremer’s “Order 37”—lowering the corporate tax rate in Iraq 
from 40% to flat 15%- and “Order 39”—allowing foreign companies to take 
100% of the profit out of the country without facing any tax penalty—Iraq 
had become the most wide open market on the globe.119   The need for 
security for Bremer and other members of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) led to the need for constant monitoring and safety checks.  
So as of August 28, 2003 Blackwater was awarded a no bid “sole source” 
contract to provide the security for Bremer at a cost of $27.7 million 
dollars.120  This provided Bremer with a team of 36 “protection 
specialists,” two K-9 teams, and Three MD-530 Boeing Helicopters, also 
known as “Little Birds.”  With this contract the cost of personal security 
details (PSD) in Iraq shot up from a standard $300 a day to over $600 
dollars a day.  These wages did not come without a price.  On May 7th, 
2004 an audiotape with the purported  voice of Osama Bin Laden was 
                                                 
119 Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero”, Harper’s, September 2004, http://www.harpers.org (accessed 
Nov.22, 2007) 
120 Blackwater,  pg. 69  
59
issued; “We in al Qaeda organization will guarantee, God willing, 10,000 
grams of gold to whoever kills the occupier Bremer, or the American chief 
commander or his deputy in Iraq."121  This report did not include the 
$50,000 price tag put on each of the protection specialists assigned to 
Bremer.122    
 One major incident has plagued the reputation of Blackwater 
since their entrance into the Iraq war in force.  In this instance, questions 
as to the culpability of Blackwater (and in turn, the MPF industry as a 
whole) have become more evident and debated.  On March 31, 2004 a 
situation took place in the city of Fallujah in central Iraq.  Four men on a 
security detail transporting food service equipment across the city were 
ambushed in a coordinated assault.  The convoy encountered a temporary 
detour sign which led them into the attack.  The vehicles were hit with 
rocket propelled grenades (RPG) then peppered with small arms fire.  The 
bodies were pulled from the still flaming vehicles and beaten with shovels, 
after which they were dismembered and then dragged behind trucks while 
the others were hung from a bridge that crosses over the Euphrates River.  
Pictures and video of the subsequent mob frenzy were shown on news 
outlets such as CNN and all of the major network news stations.  In the 
U.S. the anger was palpable.  People wanted punishment to be dealt out to 
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the perpetrators. In a news conference the day after the ambush in 
Baghdad, a U. S. Army spokesman stated, “Quite simply, we will 
respond.”123  The aftermath of the incident was that 36 marines and 
hundreds of civilians  killed as U.S. forces committed to a direct assault on 
Fallujah.   
The story behind this tragic event has put Blackwater in a defensive 
position as they are being sued for the wrongful deaths of the four 
contractors, Stephen "Scott" Helvenston, Mike Teague, Jerko Zovko and 
Wesley Batalona by the families of the men slain in Fallujah.  The content 
of the lawsuit contends that Blackwater knowingly let the four men head 
into a situation without the proper security precautions in place in order to 
fulfill a hastily negotiated contract that they had taken from a rival PSC, 
Control Risk Groups of London.  The lawsuit claims that Blackwater 
violated its contracts with  Eurest Support Services (Known as ESS), a 
Kuwaiti partner called Regency Hotels and the contractors themselves by 
not conducting a proper risk assessment, shorting the number of 
personnel needed for the mission by two people, and not providing the 
proper equipment such as up-armored vehicles and essential weaponry. 124 
What comes to question in this horrific incident is the responsibility 
of Blackwater to maintain the safety of its contractors.  The appearance of 
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profit over safety is hard to work around as questions about the above 
points remain unanswered.  Blackwater itself has remained quiet about 
these allegations choosing to allow its lawyers (including former special 
prosecutor Kenneth Starr) to speak on its behalf.  To take the use of the 
phrase “armored” in the contract as an example, John Potter--the 
Blackwater supervisor for the ESS contract--had indicated earlier to 
management that the omission of the phrase “armored” from the contract 
would not only violate the terms of the contract, but place the contractors 
themselves in mortal danger should an attack take place.125  He was 
subsequently fired and replaced by another supervisor.  In the ensuing 
lawsuit, Potter was called to provide deposition for the plaintiffs in the 
case.  The date for the deposition was set for January 28, 2005, however 3 
days prior Potter had been rehired by Blackwater and shipped to Jordan 
for deployment in the Middle East.126 Blackwater then attempted to have 
the deposition dissolved, but a federal court judge said no to the request. 
Blackwater countered by saying that Potter was no longer in their employ.  
When lawyers for the family attempted to have Potter again come to the 
deposition in November of 2006 when it was discovered that he was back 
in the U.S., Blackwater claimed that Potter’s deposition would reveal 
classified information.  At this point the U.S. attorney’s office stepped in 
citing the need to review Potters supposed possession of classified 
information and documents that would be pertinent to the case. 127  It is 
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within the context of this legal maneuvering involving the federal 
government that deeper concerns arose.  As government involvement in 
the case supersedes the ability of the plaintiffs to gather information about 
the events of March 31, 2004, the subtle yet undeniable statement is that 
while Blackwater is not a government agency, the work that they carry out 
can be treated as such and branded as a matter of national security.  
Blackwater argues that they have been recognized by the Pentagon as a 
part of the “Total Force” of the U.S. military and prosecution of wrongful 
death suits would undermine the ability of the President to carry out 
foreign policy.128   This duality of being both in the private sector and part 
of the “Total Force” in Iraq makes Blackwater immune to both civil and 
criminal charges.  As it stands, a Blackwater claim to be a private entity 
and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) and working for the government in carrying out what it 
calls “a classic military function- providing an armed escort for a supply 
convoy under orders to reach a military base…” puts it in a legal grey area.  
The question of responsibility is then placed beyond the reach of any legal 
system giving Blackwater the ability to operate with a level of impunity 
unknown in the MPF sector. 129 
The MPF has a power that all other actors in the PMF field do not, 
namely the chance and ability to carry out direct conflict with the enemy.  
This power is not often engaged; however, an incident that occurred 
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several days after the Fallujah incident illustrates this ability.  On April 4, 
2004, in the city of Najaf an incident  took place where a group of 
Blackwater contractors, Salvadorian peacekeepers, and a U.S. Marine 
corporal were embroiled in a 4 hour gun battle with elements of the 
insurgent force known as the Mahdi army.  This battle was documented on 
video and later uploaded to Youtube, a social video site. During this battle 
contractors made numerous attempts to contact the U.S. military to 
provide intervention.  The intervention was limited to a smart bomb 
dropped by the Marines.  In the meantime Blackwater helicopters flew in 
to pick up wounded and supply the fighters with more ammunition.130  As 
the Blackwater security team was met and engaged in combat, it ceased to 
be a Private Security Company and took on the role of Private Military 
Company.  While this incident was relatively small, the MPFs engagement 
in combat is an eventuality that will need to be faced. As more contractors 
arrive in country-- there are an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 there 
currently-- the odds of such a conflict occurring again grow exponentially 
larger.131  This logic can be expanded to include any area of conflict that 
will include the presence of MPFs.  Executive Outcomes is the prototype of 
the modern privatized military.  The Executive Outcomes model in African 
conflicts such as Angola and Sierra Leone was to provide not only training 
for the contracting forces, but direct involvement in the conflicts by 
leading the soldiers they had trained.  Such conflict maybe an anomaly 
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right now, but as more credence is given to the MPF as a viable training 
service and force multiplier, where will the privatization of conflict lead?  
Blackwater itself has recently incorporated another company in the island 
nation of Barbados known as Greystone Ltd.  This new branch of 
Blackwater has been marketed as “an international supplier of turn-key 
security solutions.  Greystone focuses on providing stability to locations 
experiencing turmoil whether caused by armed conflict, epidemics, or 
natural or man-made disasters.”132   As Robert Young Pelton points out in 
Greystone’s corporate brochure one paragraph stands out:  
 
Proactive Engagement Teams: 
Greystone elements are prepared to configure capabilities to meet 
emergent or existing security requirements for client needs overseas. Our 
teams are ready to conduct stabilization efforts, asset protection and 
recovery, and emergency personnel withdrawal. 133  
 
Nowhere else in the website does this phrasing appear, but the wording 
makes clear that Blackwater is planning to venture outside of the security 
field and into the direct conflict field.  This shows that Blackwater figures 
to be engaged in the MPF field for long into the future and wants to 
expand its operations even further into direct action role.     
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The process of examining Military Provider Firms is important for 
several reasons.  First, the companies themselves operate as below the 
radar as possible while remaining legal entities. With issues such as 
employee security and to a lesser extent proprietary knowledge such as 
bidding on contracts to consider, this stealthy operation tends to lead to 
speculation as to their motive and method.  So looking at the question of 
oversight and accountability is obscured by two things.  One, the notion of 
“fair play” in contract negotiations and two, the level of state secrecy 
involved in the execution of the contract. Both of these things allow 
companies to mask contracts and actions taken in the veil of  need-to-
know information.   
 The idea of cost effectiveness of the military provider firm can be 
brought into question with the example of Blackwater’s involvement in 
Hurricane Katrina.  Blackwater laid claim to providing its services pro-
bono during the disaster relief effort in New Orleans.  This was proven not 
to be the case as Blackwater was paid nearly $73 million dollars by June of 
2006 to protect FEMA staff during the reconstruction. 134  A question that 
comes from such a long term and expensive contract is; why? Why was it 
necessary to have Blackwater security details in New Orleans with the 
presence of National Guard troops, state and local law enforcement, as 
well volunteer police forces from around the country?  Several members of 
Congress including Rep. Jan Schakowsky and Senator Barack Obama 
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questioned the validity of the use of Blackwater, with Senator Obama 
commenting: “It strikes me with all the National Guardsmen we’ve got 
down there, with the local Law enforcement that are back on the job and 
putting their lives back together again, that that may not be the best use of 
money”135  
Finally, looking at Blackwater as a technological phenomenon 
shows that Blackwater is at the forefront of creating its own brands of 
military technology. As Blackwater grows in size and capacity, so too does 
its range of services. Currently the varied interests of the Prince Group—
the parent company of Blackwater U.S.A., Greystone Ltd., and the newly 
founded Total Intelligence Solutions--a company that offers intelligence 
analysis for both industry and government--moves Blackwater further 
away from just being a provider of brawn to a provider of brains.136  
Sophisticated training, experienced personnel from all branches of 
government, and the ability to provide turnkey solutions have made 
Blackwater a highly technical organization with the ability to act as a 
military and security one-stop-shop for corporations and governments. 
For example, Blackwater has developed the Grizzly Armored Personnel 
Carrier in house, while the Department of Defense has developed the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP).137  Both vehicles are 
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reported to provide elevated protection to the occupants against 
Improvised Explosive Devices.  The cost of the vehicles has becomes the 
major separating point.  Each of the MRAPs is reported to cost upwards of  
$1.5 million dollars—there are several models either in development or 
already on the ground in Iraq—and are being overproduced to lower 
costs;138  
‘We might not need as many as we are buying. Some 
will be stored for a period of time,’ said John Young, the 
defense acquisition undersecretary. ‘The service chiefs have 
indicated that these are heavy, large vehicles that might not 
fit well with mobile expeditionary missions.’139 
 
 
 
Blackwater has not revealed the cost of producing the Grizzly, but 
vehicles of a similar nature cost approximately half a million dollars.140  
Blackwater will initially be producing around 300 a year in a 100,000 
square foot facility in Moyock N.C.  As Blackwater continues to develop 
much of their own equipment, their need to rely on outside sources 
decreases.  This also means that they themselves will become producers 
who can sell their brand to other organizations and move in a much 
quicker fashion from drawing board to production while utilizing that 
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brand name.  While the MRAP is designed as an all-around vehicle meant 
for multiple tasks—which more than likely added to the massive costs—the 
Grizzly shows that Military Provider Firms are able to use their own 
technical knowledge to develop their own equipment.  Where this will take 
them in the future is only limited by questions of legality as opposed to 
technical know-how.    
By looking at the relationship between the contractors and the 
military through jobs the PMF have completed or failed, we can begin to 
see how the PMF are playing more of a role as providers of not just 
technology and advice but of security itself.  Each of the companies above 
has shown that this is an industry that will not be marginalized.  Even with 
the numerous incidents of impropriety reported now almost daily in the 
media, Private Military Firms have become integral to the structure of the 
transnational economic system that is in place now.  If threats of removal 
from Iraq were to be followed through with Blackwater, it has created such 
an elaborate web of contracting jobs throughout the globe  that they would 
simply be able to move onto the next opportunity.  Cofer Black’s offer of a 
brigade of Blackwater contractors to work as peace enforcers in Sudan 
speaks of the industry’s ability to function not only as an extension of 
government policy but as a transnational force independent of national 
agendas.  This ultimately leads to the question of what will happen when 
MPF meets MPF on the battlefield.  A situation such as this took place 
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during Executive Outcomes time in Angola.141  Soldiers from the former 
South African Defense Force were known to have been recruited by forces 
opposing EO.142  Will such a conflict affect the nature of conflict amongst 
nations or is this ultimately a logical progression to the incorporation of 
the growing use of globalized resources in the post modern world?        
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Chapter  Three, “The Post Gulf War Environment” 
Military strategy has altered significantly since the end of the cold 
war.  Nations are using the privatized military option on a more frequent 
basis to solve foreign policy issues.  In turn, the privatized military 
industry owes much of its success to the main purchasers of their services.  
Without government, privatized military services would not have been 
able to reach the heights they have attained in recent years with such 
rapidity or the level of acceptability they have garnered. In this section I 
will look at the fetal stage of the PMF against the backdrop of several 
critical U.S. military operations.  It is my hope to show that the rise of the 
Private Military Firm in U.S. foreign policy is not a new event nor is it 
specific to one political party.  From the PMF’s beginnings under the 
Clinton administration in the U.S. as a reaction to the tragic events in 
Mogadishu up to their use by the current Bush administration as a force 
multiplier in the Iraq war,  most Private Military Firms have less to do 
with  political affiliation and more to do with expansion of market share.  
Due to the nature of globalized commerce and the willingness of 
governments to use outsourced solutions—such as Executive Outcomes in 
Angola—Private Military Firms represent a departure from the state-
centric nature of conflict—as was seen in previous centuries and  reaching 
its pinnacle with the cold war--towards a decentralized, contract-based 
form of violence.      
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I will begin with the early nineties and look at the heady days of 
post Gulf War Iraq and the use of contractors on the battlefield.  This will 
begin with the first outright use of PMCs in the Angolan conflict of the 
early nineties. The use of Executive Outcomes by the Angolan state 
showed how a small unit of highly trained contractors could tip not only  
the balance of the conflict, but empower the Angolan state enough to bring 
the rebel UNITA group to the bargaining table. This will be followed by  
the Battle of Mogadishu and the chilling effect that this engagement had 
on the U.S. and its foreign policy choices in the early nineties.  It is at this 
point in time when the modern PMF is seen to have its beginning with the 
initiation of the first Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
contract.   This will be followed by their first major engagement in the 
Balkans with DynCorp and Brown and Root as the main provider of such 
services as repairing of equipment, construction of camps, and food 
service and preparation and Military Personnel Resource Inc. (MPRI) 
providing controversial services to the Croats.  It was during this period of 
time that the U.S. government started to embrace the PMF as a viable 
alternative to the use of an extensive military presence in regional conflicts 
such the Balkans.  All of these events led up to what has become the 
quintessential moment of the industry: the Iraq War.  In this war the 
relationship between government and the industry has evolved into a near 
symbiotic one, with the cogs of government relying more and more on the 
PMF grease to move the conflict forward.   I will examine some of the 
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legislation that has been passed in the years leading up to the war and how 
the altered landscape of conflict has been affected by this relationship.   
   Executive Outcomes (EO) is amongst the most successful  private 
military organizations.  From its inception it has been an organization that 
has been the model by which other MPFs measure success.  With its 
founding in 1989 by Lt. Colonel Eeben Barlow of the South African 
Defense Force’s elite 32 reconnaissance battalion, EO created a military 
organization that acted as a de-facto state army including Special Forces 
training, fixed and rotary wing combat air patrols, and one specific service 
listed on their website as simply “discretionary warfare.”143  EO had taken 
part in combat operations across the globe, however, this section will focus 
specifically on the events that took place in the West African nation of 
Angola in the spring of 1993.  During this conflict, EO managed to halt a 
civil war that had been raging in the country since its independence from 
Portugal in 1975.  The two main participants in the conflict, the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Party of Labour (MPLA) and the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were each 
backed in the conflict by the Soviet bloc and the U.S. and South Africa 
respectively.144  During the 1980’s both sides of the conflict were well 
funded by these states, with South Africa even providing military 
advisement and direct combat roles through specialized units within the 
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South African Defense Force (SADF) including the notorious Koevoet 
(Afrikaans for crowbar), a police counter-insurgency unit which had been 
accused of brutal and indiscriminant tactics during the South West African 
border wars of the 1970’s and 80’s.145  
However, in the post cold war environment of the nineties, funding 
for the conflict dried up leaving the MPLA to fight its own war of which the 
government was unable to continue. This was due to the end of Apartheid 
as a political system in South Africa. With the end of Apartheid, president 
Nelson Mandela ordered the disbandment of the SADF special forces 
units, leaving a substantial number of what are considered to be some of 
the  finest special operations units in the world, literally out of a job.146  
Barlow recruited these men to form Executive Outcomes.  In March of 
1993, UNITA captured an oil processing plant in the town of Soyo.  
Branch-Heritage Oil and the Sonogal, the state owned oil company, were 
unable to extract the equipment from Soyo due to UNITA’s refusal to allow 
the removal.  State forces were to be brought in, but concerns about 
damage to the equipment ruled the option out.  It was at this point that EO 
was brought in to retake the town.  With a force of 80 “security guards” as 
the government initially referred to the unit, EO was able to remove the 
UNITA soldiers.147  As soon as EO forces withdrew from Soyo, UNITA 
forces moved back in and retook the village along with the production 
                                                 
145 South African Press Association, “Koevoet Killer Confesses to Truth Commission.”  July 23, 1997. 
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equipment.  However, after witnessing the effectiveness of the EO forces 
President De Santos of Angola personally invited Tony Buckingham of 
Heritage Oil  and Simon Mann of EO to discuss arrangements to have EO 
train the Angolan Army, known also as the FAA.148  In September of 1993 
a deal was penned for EO to provide training for the FAA for one year at 
the price of $40 million dollars.149  This deal included the retraining of the 
16th brigade which had ironically been completely leveled by  the civil war 
in the 80’s by the SADF.150  This provided the FAA with the advantage of 
learning from their mistakes as EO showed the FAA where it had made its 
mistakes during their initial engagements.  The involvement of EO 
soldiers--numbering 500--completely turned the tide of the conflict in 
favor of the government.  UNITA forces were bewildered by the use of 
night assaults, deep air strikes, and special forces raids on command 
centers.  In November of 1994 UNITA, badly beaten and in disarray, 
agreed to the Lusaka peace accords.  As part of the peace accord, UNITA 
stipulated a “repatriation of all mercenaries” as a nod to the effectiveness 
of the EO forces.151  
During this same period of time, on the opposite side of the African 
continent, a blow was about to be meted out to the U.S. war machine.  The 
battle of Mogadishu occurred on October 3, 1993 in the city of Mogadishu, 
Somalia.  The operation--known as Gothic Serpent--was mean to capture 
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high-level members of the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid’s clan 
of fighters.  The year previous to the battle in August of 1992, President 
H.W. Bush answered a call from the UN for member nations to provide 
security for UN food transportation.  Bush ordered 25,000 U.S. troops to 
lead the UN contingent, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), into 
Somalia to quell the civil unrest caused by a civil war begun the year 
before, a war that had left close to half a million Somalis dead due to war 
and famine.    
As the Presidency changed hands in 1993 the newly elected 
President Clinton reduced the American combat contingent from 25,000 
to 1200 combat soldiers and 3000 support troops.152   With this decline in 
forces violence in Mogadishu rose. On June 5, 1993, 24 Pakistani 
peacekeepers were ambushed, killed, and brutalized by General Aidid’s 
forces.153  The day after the incident the UN passed resolution 837 which 
strongly condemned and called for military action against those 
responsible for the ambush.  Evidence mounted in the days after the attack 
and on June 17 the UN called for the arrest of Aidid.  Efforts to capture 
Aidid proved to be fruitless.  It was at this point that a U.S. contingent of 
Special Operations Forces was activated.  Consisting of Army, Navy, and 
Air force elements, the group known as Task Force Ranger was assigned 
the job of capturing Aidid.  A short series of operations netted information 
that a meeting was to take place between Aidid and his lieutenants at the 
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Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu on October third.  The ensuing melee proved 
to be disastrous for American forces.  In total eighteen Americans were 
killed, with a particularly gruesome incident where the body of a U.S. 
soldier was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in displays not 
dissimilar from what would happen in Fallujah eleven  years later.154   
 
The effects of this battle were felt immediately around the world as 
Canadian journalist Paul Watson’s photo of the event would later win him 
the Pulitzer Prize that year for spot news photography.155  The photo 
depicts the body of American Staff Sergeant David Cleveland being 
dragged behind a vehicle while being surrounded by cheering Somalis.  
The power of the image was such that President Clinton directed the head 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time to stop all action against Aidid and 
his forces excluding self-defense.  Clinton also ordered Ambassador 
Robert Oakley, the key figure in brokering the peace in 1992, back to 
Somalia to negotiate the release of U.S. Army Ranger Michael Durant, a 
Ranger who had been captured in the battle.156  U.S. forces were also to 
leave Mogadishu by no later than March 31, 1994 with only a small 
contingent of Marines off the coast in case of a civilian evacuation.   The 
long-term effect on American foreign policy was an extreme reluctance to 
use any American forces where there was a possibility of causalities.  This 
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for example affected the U.S. response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 
and to the wars in the Balkans in the mid nineties.157  No American forces 
were used in Rwanda, with the administration neglecting to even use the 
word “genocide” to describe the actions in Rwanda.  In the Balkans the 
U.S. limited most of its engagements to air strikes as war atrocities took 
place throughout the war and did not commit troops until 1996 after the 
Bosnian war had ended. 158  
In 1992, as the post Gulf war cleanup continued in Iraq, then 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recognized the need to have an 
infrastructure in place outside of the massive military bureaucracy to 
handle a future conflict such as the Gulf War. The pentagon then asked 
private contractors to bid on a $3.9 million dollar contract outlining a 
contingency plan in which the private sector would aid in the logistical 
process of establishing a U.S. military presence. The plan itself is still a 
classified study; however, it is known that Brown and Root, a subsidiary of 
Halliburton, came out the winner of the bidding.159  According to one GAO 
report:  
The original LOGCAP contractor, Brown and Root 
Services Corporation of Houston, Texas, was competitively 
awarded a cost-plus-award-fee contract for 1 year with 4 
option years on August 3, 1992. 160 According to Army 
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documents, a notice regarding the contract in the Commerce 
Business Daily elicited 37 requests for copies of the 
solicitation. Four companies competed for the contract. The 
1992 LOGCAP contract required the contractor to first 
develop a worldwide management plan and 13 regional 
plans; second, participate in planning and exercises; and 
third be prepared to execute the plans upon notification. 161 
 
 
 It was an ambitious plan to say the least and marked the first time 
that a project of such scale would be undertaken by a private entity.  
Brown and Root was given another $5 million on top of the $3.9 million 
and asked to expand the contract with more detail and several more 
locations. The contract was the largest and most comprehensive ever 
awarded under what was known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP).162  LOGCAP had existed before the contract with the 
creation of Army field manual AR 700-137 on December 15, 1985.163  
During the Vietnam War the military had relied heavily on using 
contractors in the construction of bases and the maintenance of heavy 
equipment such as the B-52 bomber.  LOGCAP was envisioned as a 
preplanned way of utilizing contractors on the battlefield.  The first major 
use of LOGCAP did not occur until after the Gulf War, due to its primary 
design as a program for use when bilateral or multilateral agreements did 
                                                                                                                                                 
 “A cost-plus-award-fee contract allows the contractor to be reimbursed for all reasonable, allowable, and 
allocable costs incurred. Under the original contract, the contractor earns a base fee of 1 percent of the 
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not exist and our relationship with the Saudi government as a host nation 
the use of LOGCAP was seen as unnecessary.  During the 1990-91 Persian 
Gulf War, LOGCAP was not used. Instead, contractors were hired on 
hundreds of separate contracts to provide logistics support with uneven 
results. There are numerous examples of contracts awarded with poorly 
defined or missing Statements of Work and unclear contract 
requirements.  These situations led to inadequate contractor performance 
and customer dissatisfaction at significant cost.  The contractors' payment 
vouchers still had to be honored, however, because the poorly written 
contractual requirements contained no basis upon which to reject their 
claims for payment.  In the several operations that occurred after the 
Persian Gulf War, a revised version of LOGCAP was used and eventually 
enacted in U.S./NATO operations in the Balkans, also known as LOGCAP 
II.   KBR, the winner of this contract, was to supply the following:  
 
Base camp construction and maintenance; showers; 
latrines; food service and supply; sewage/solid waste 
removal; water production, storage, and distribution; shuttle 
bus service; bulk fuel receipt, storage, and issue; heavy 
equipment transportation; mail delivery; construction 
material storage and distribution; railhead operations; and 
seaport operations.164 
 
These services were initially estimated to be valued at $350.2 
millions dollars.165  The contract was for the construction of 14 large bases 
of operation located on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
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Croatia with exception of one base located close to the Hungarian city of 
Kaspovar.  This plan, however, changed as concerns about weather and 
operational viability from the initial 14 large bases to 34 smaller bases.   
 
 
 
Our [GAO] discussions with the Commander in Chief 
of U.S. Army, Europe and his staff revealed that the 
commander decided to increase the number of camps 
required because of several factors. Two factors were the size 
of the U.S. area of responsibility (the United States had to 
patrol a 1,200-mile zone of separation between the warring 
factions), and the condition of the soil and limited 
infrastructure (a very wet and mine-filled terrain and 
devastated power, water, and communication systems).166  
 
 
The actual cost of the operation as of December 7, 1996 had 
ballooned to  $461.5 million exceeding its initial estimate of $350.2 
million by $111.3 million, or 32 percent.  Decisions made by the U.S. Army 
affected that final number.  Choices such as the construction of 34 smaller 
bases as opposed to the original 14 large bases went into affect, as well as a 
value added tax created by the Hungarian government totaling $18 million 
dollars for a base on Hungarian soil. 167  
While this presence was meant to be on a temporary basis, the U.S. 
had entrenched its position in the Balkan states deeply despite the UN 
Security Council Resolution 713 also known as the UN arms embargo.168  
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This was seen in several cases as a way to solidify American post cold war 
victory, as the former USSR was in no position to carry out any aid 
missions while it dealt with its own internal strife during the post Soviet 
era.  
 
 
 
These goals in order of strategic priority were as 
follows; consolidate America's political and military presence 
in Europe, strengthen Croatia's military while bolstering its 
strategic position in the Balkan region, and lastly, bind them 
into Washington's web of existing security arrangements.169 
 
  
 The United States was unable to support any side of the conflict 
militarily as the UN arms embargo prevented any such advances toward 
any of the three separate governments in the conflict.  The President of 
Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, was considered an ally of the U.S. in the region 
and was seen as the U.S. opportunity to gain a valuable foothold in the 
region.  In March of 1994 the then Croatian Defense Minister, Gojko 
Susak, visited Washington with a request for U.S. military aid in the 
conflict.  Due to the Arms embargo the U.S. was unable to assist the Croats 
directly.  This however did not prevent the Deputy Defense Secretary John 
Deutch from passing the request along to Military Personnel Resources 
Incorporated (MPRI) a Military Consulting Firm from Virginia.  The U.S., 
by using its connection to MPRI, had sidestepped the provisions of the 
Arms embargo, which included strategic planning as well as equipment, 
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while remaining within the spirit of the embargo.  MPRI was officially 
awarded the contract in September of 1994 when Susak and Carl Vuono 
signed the Democracy Transition Assistance Program. The program is 
described on MPRI’s website: 
 
 
 
MPRI developed a multi-year program to provide 
leadership and management skills and a personnel 
management system to the Croatian Armed Forces…MPRI 
conducted a pilot program to evaluate the content and 
conduct of each course, emphasizing the development of 
qualified Croatian instructors for follow-on presentations 
and assumption of responsibility for the total programs.170  
 
 
It is within this description that one can see there is no mention of 
any type of strategic training, only of the democratization of the military in 
order for it to become subservient to the civil government.  This program 
was seen as a step in the right direction for the Croatian government as the 
first officers graduated in April of 1995.  Croatian officers had been 
educated in the ways of a democratic (read: Western) military.  
What comes into question during this time is MPRI’s involvement 
in two military operations carried out the by Croats against the Serbs less 
than a month after graduating, namely Operation Flash and Operation 
Storm.171  From May 1-3 1995, Operation Flash was carried out across 
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southern Croatia, capturing a substantial amount of territory once held by 
minority Serb Croats followed by Operation Storm, a major offensive 
launched in August of the same year causing the largest mass evacuations 
in Europe since World War II.172  What was distinctive about each of the 
battles was the marked use of strategic and tactical planning on the part of 
the Croat army.   The Croat army previous to its “democracy training” by 
MPRI was disorganized at best.  Yet they managed to execute a 
sophisticated battle plan using infantry, air power, and artillery to rout the 
Serbian Croats and begin the mass exodus.  Allegations of MPRI’s 
involvement in planning the course of the battle are denied to this day by 
MPRI officials, as MPRI’s involvement in the planning of the maneuver 
would constitute U.S. intervention and would therefore be a violation of 
the Arms embargo.  However there was indirect U.S. government 
involvement in the region through CIA and DIA intelligence reports being 
handed to the Croats as well a series of secret meetings taking place on an 
island off the coast of Croatia.   
 
 . . . According to one report, MPRI executive director 
General Carl E. Vuono ‘held a secret top level meeting at 
Brioni Island, off the coast of Croatia, with Gen. Varimar 
Cervenko, the architect of the Krajina campaign. In the five 
days preceding the attack, at least ten meetings were held 
between General Vuono and officers involved in the 
campaign. . .  173 
                                                                                                                                                 
had arranged for an attack on a Croatian vehicle on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, to provide a motive for the 
launching of Flash, while at the same time negotiating a peace deal with the Serbian Croats.  
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Operation Storm went down as one of the greatest human rights violations 
committed during the Balkan wars, with UN reports of unmarked 
gravesites and as reported by Canadian UN observers during an 
impromptu press conference:  
 
Calvin [a Canadian officer] . . . loudly accused the 
Croats of trying to hide war crimes against the Serb 
inhabitants. All livestock had been killed and houses torched. 
French reconnaissance troops and the Canadian command 
element pushed up the valley and soon began to find bodies 
of Serb civilians, some already decomposing, others freshly 
slaughtered . . . 174  
   
As part of the negotiations that took place in Dayton-Paris 
Agreement in November 1995, a provision introduced by the Bosnian 
government was that their own forces be trained by MPRI as well.175  The 
method of payment for this training was through donations from 
moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), which would in turn be managed by the 
United States.  MPRI went on after this contract to step in the war in 
neighboring Kosovo, as a contract was set between MPRI and Macedonia 
in 1999.  This contract created a unique situation.  It meant that forces 
trained by MPRI would be on both sides of the conflict with soldiers from 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) having been trained by MPRI at the 
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Croatian school and on the opposite side, the recently independent 
Macedonian state armed forces.   
In June of 1999 the U.S. began construction on Camp Bondsteel 
just outside of the Kosovar town of Uroševac.176  The initial contract for 
the construction was held by KBR in cooperation with the 94th Engineer 
Construction Battalion.  The final result was the largest base constructed 
outside of the U.S. since the Vietnam War.177 In a recent settlement, KBR 
agreed to pay the U.S. government $8 million dollars under the False 
Claims Act due to double-billing, inflating prices and providing products 
that did not fit the Army's needs during the construction.178  The 
settlement came in November of 2006, nearly 7 years after the completion 
of the base due to events in Iraq, according to Patrick Burns of Taxpayers 
against Fraud, a lobbying group based in Washington DC that monitors 
fraud cases against the government.179  Looking at KBRs involvement in 
the construction of this base and other bases throughout the Balkans 
shows that the government commitment to using contractors extends back 
previous to the supposed necessities of the Iraq war and brings to question 
Vice President Cheney’s involvement in extensive government contracting.   
Concurrently, as Cheney was pioneering more expansive 
privatization in the military, Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of 
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Defense for Policy at the time, wrote a paper entitled "Defense Planning 
Guidance” (DPG).  Leaked to the New York Times in late February of 
1992, the essence of the paper states the U.S. should work towards 
maintaining its superpower status in the world by discouraging both 
friend and foe from advancing any notions of competing with the U.S. 
economically or militarily.  This paper closely correlates to a letter written 
5 years later by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 
which the strategy laid out by Wolfowitz—one of a long list of self 
professed “neo-conservatives” who co-signed the letter—is put in the 
following terms180: 
We need to increase defense spending significantly if 
we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and 
modernize our armed forces for the future; we need to 
strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge 
regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to 
promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; 
we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in 
preserving and extending an international order friendly to 
our security, our prosperity, and our principles. 181   
  
This letter was later expanded upon in the now famous “Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses” paper which fleshes out the ideas presented in the 
DPG.  In it, the PNAC spells out what the U.S. military should look like to 
                                                 
180 The names included on the list are: Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett,  Jeb Bush, Dick 
Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg,Francis Fukuyama, 
Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan,  Zalmay Khalilzad,  I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan 
Quayle, Peter W. Rodman,  Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George 
Weigel, and Paul Wolfowitz 
181 Project for the New American Century, “Statement Of Principles.” June 3, 1997,  
http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm (accessed June 29, 2007) 
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maintain is preeminence in global geopolitical affairs. 182  As the report 
goes from each branch of the military to the next, the message is clear: 
increased spending on military infrastructure and research and 
development should be the priority of the next President.  
At the dawn of this militarized foreign policy vision in 1997, the 
military was experiencing a post cold war entropy.  As the Berlin Wall fell 
and the Soviet Union completed its ultimate deterioration in the early 
90’s, a shadow fell across the Pentagon with the realization that 
communism was dead.  The largest military budget in the world, with 
almost 33% of the world military budget being spent in the United States 
in 1992, had to face its ultimate enemy:  the peace dividend.183  The 
massive cold war military buildup had lost its purpose in the world.  The 
next logical step after this buildup was the decommissioning of vast swaths 
of the armed services.  In this plan millions of soldiers and civil servants 
were decommissioned, followed by the closing of military bases of many 
nations around the world.  This left the creators of the Defense Planner 
Guidance paper  in a quandary: how does a nation which has declared 
itself “the world’s policeman,” maintain its level of power without the 
ability to enforce its agenda?  Since the end of the cold war, some 7 million 
servicepersons have been moved from their respective country’s militaries 
into the private sector.  The U.S. military alone has removed well over a 
million active duty soldiers between 1987 and 2005 with many of these 
                                                 
182 Ibid.  
183Truth and Politics, “U.S. Military Spending- International Comparisons.”, 2002 
http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-US-world.php (accessed June 29, 2007) 
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soldiers having been trained, at great expense to the tax payer, in 
extremely specialized areas including intelligence gathering, special 
operations warfare, and logistics.184  With a labor pool of such intense 
specialization suddenly on the open market, where could they take their 
skills and apply them in a world without the traditional enemies?  Also, 
with caps being placed on the numbers of soldiers able to be deployed to 
almost all regions of the world, the concept of privately contracting out 
such services from laundry to base security became more appealing.  The 
primary mission of military personnel could be carried out by the military, 
while service based missions could be farmed out to more “efficient” 
private contracting firms such as Vinnell, Halliburton, and Bechtel with all 
their subsidiaries and subcontracting connections.    
September 11, 2001 and the War in Afghanistan 
On September 10, 2001, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave 
a speech at the Pentagon entitled “Bureaucracy to Battlefield,” setting 
forward what later would come to be known as the “Rumsfeld Doctrine.”  
The basic tenets of this military strategy are cutting edge combat 
equipment such as the Landwarrior system, heavy reliance on fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft for support, and small highly trained ground forces 
                                                 
184 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies.”, Occasional Paper number 6, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces,  Geneva, SW, March 2005, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security_pdf/2005_Schreier_Caparini.p
df , (accessed July 3, 2007) 
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such as special operations forces.185  In this speech Rumsfeld stated what 
his vision for the U.S. military was to be for his tenure in office.186  He 
discussed what he considered America’s greatest military threat at the 
time.  In this speech he stated: 
The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a 
serious threat, to the security of the United States of 
America. This adversary is one of the world's last bastions of 
central planning. It governs by dictating five-year plans. 
From a single capital, it attempts to impose its demands 
across time zones, continents, oceans and beyond. With 
brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new 
ideas. It disrupts the defense of the United States and places 
the lives of men and women in uniform at risk. 187 
 
 The speech went on to identify the adversary as the bureaucracy at 
the Pentagon.  How is it that the Secretary of Defense could make such a 
statement in the very headquarters of the entire U.S. military, and in what 
way does this speak to the increasing viability of PMFs?  To give an 
indication of the context of the speech one may only have to look at the 
occasion upon which the talk was being given, namely the Department Of 
Defense Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff.  The 
Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics department 
                                                 
185Federation of American Scientists, “Land Warrior” FAS.org,  Aug. 7, 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/land/land-warrior.htm (accessed June 30, 2007) The Land warrior is an integrated 
communication/armour/information system that will treat each soldier on the battlefield as an 
informational node.  This in turn is suppose to provide a truer picture of the battle field. The secondary 
potential of such a system is to act as a “black-box” for each soldier recording activity on the battlefield.   
186 Sharjeel Rizwan, “Revolution In Military Affairs” Defence Notes, Sept. 2000,   
http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/military.htm (accessed June 30, 2007) The speech in essence 
has become Rumsfeld’s interpretation of what is known in military circles as the “Revolution In Military 
Affairs”(RMA).  
187 Donald Rumsfeld, “Bureaucracy to Battlefield (Speech, The Pentagon, Washington D.C. Sept. 10 2001)  
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=430 (accessed June 30, 2007) 
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is responsible for all the PMC contracts the military is currently engaged 
in.  The audience was stocked with figures from the business world as 
many of the key positions held in the DoD were held by people from Enron 
(Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army), General Dynamics and 
Lockheed Martin (Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy), and 
Northrop Grumman (James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force).   When 
the terrorist attacks occurred the next day September 11th, the vision that 
Rumsfeld had for the transformation of the military was not just a vision 
anymore.  He was at the head of the primary military power in the world 
and an act of war had just been committed on American soil, in the eyes of 
the Bush administration.  In essence, Rumsfeld had been given carte 
blanche.  
National sentiment was strong for reprisal against whoever had 
committed the act.  Ultimately, Osama Bin Laden, the founder of the 
militant Muslim fundamentalist organization known as Al-Qaeda took 
responsibility for the attacks.  It was at this point that the U.S. posture 
changed.  Previous to 9/11 the U.S. position was that lethal force was 
authorized in the capturing of Bin Laden. After 9/11, a secret document 
known as a “Presidential finding” authorized the assassination of Bin 
Laden himself.188  It is within this finding that the first use of paramilitary 
forces occurs in the Global War on Terror (GWoT) with the war in 
                                                 
188 For an over view of Presidential Directives, including Presidential findings see:  Harold C Relyea,  “Order 
Code 98-611 GOV, CRS Report For Congress,  Presidential Directives:  Background and Over view”, 
Government Printing Office,  Updated April 23, 2007  http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/98-611.pdf (accessed July 
10, 2007)   
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Afghanistan, also known as Operation Enduring Freedom, on October 7th, 
2001.189   
  At the time of 9/11 none of the PSCs in operation had a vested 
interest in hiring former special operations soldiers as contract employees 
for such an occasion.  Nor did the CIA have the needed amount of 
operators at the time to fulfill such a mission. An ad-hoc procurement 
program was created.  The procurement was led by Billy Waugh, a long 
time CIA contractor and former Special Forces sergeant major, involving 
approximately five dozen ex Special Forces operators whom were either 
retired or pinched from the military to provide security and train Afghanis.  
The operation was unsuccessful, as relations between the Afghans and the 
CIA groups were strained at best due to mistrust on both sides.190  After an 
initial push with his detachment--known as Special Forces Operation 
Detachment Alpha 594--involving several successful operations,  Waugh 
lost his lust for the chase.191  He went home having never killed the man he 
had been given authorization to kill by the President of the United 
States.192 Within less than a year, the U.S. and a “Coalition of the Willing” 
would start the second major conflict in the Gulf region, namely the Iraq 
                                                 
189 Initially the Afghan war was known as Operation Infinite Justice, however after protests from several 
sects within the Islamic faith claiming that only Allah was the embodiment of infinite Justice, the name was 
changed to Enduring Freedom.  
190 Licensed to Kill , pg. 5 
191 Much of initial combat in Operation Enduring Freedom was carried out in the vein of the Rumsfeld 
Doctrine, specifically with the use of numerous Special Forces elements. For a more detailed history of the 
early efforts in Afghanistan see: US Army Center for Military History “The U.S. Army in Afghanistan 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM” Army.mil., March 17, 2006,   
http://www.army.mil/cmh/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm (accessed 
June30, 2007) 
192  Licensed to Kill, pg. 20;  This was not Waugh’s first encounter with Bin Laden.  Waugh’s  CIA missions 
placed him in Sudan in early 1989, home to numerous Islamic radicals, including Bin Laden.  “Just one 
damn ten cent bullet” Waugh is quoted as saying about Bin Laden.  
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War.  It was within the context of this war that PMCs became a presence 
that reached near equal numbers with the U.S. military and far outsized 
any other coalition forces.   
In examining the presence of PMCs in the Iraq War, one must look 
to the overwhelming numbers and tasks contracted out; the military was 
seen as the fighting element.  This meant that the Army and Marine Corps 
would be on the ground in combat, while the Navy and Air force would 
provide support through air power.  This left little if any time for static 
duties such as security, maintenance, or support roles such as logistics and 
transportation.  Therefore, the role of the PSC in Iraq was seen as a natural 
progression.  The ability of the contractor to work outside of the military’s 
horizontal system of authorization--with one layer of bureaucracy on top 
of the other--was seen as the prime motivator in bringing efficiency to the 
business of war.   Even before the commencement of the ground war in 
Iraq however, there was internal strife at the Pentagon over contracting 
policies. Thomas E. White would resign from his position as the Secretary 
of the Army on April 25, 2003 over what he cited as the military’s inability 
to manage the massive contractor force that was to provide the bulk of 
service to the war-fighting component of the armed services.  In a 
memorandum sent to Rumsfeld on March 8, 2002, White states in essence 
that little oversight has been given to the process of hiring contractors 
within the Pentagon, causing budget overruns and duplication of 
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charges.193  This memorandum was followed shortly afterwards by a 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in May of 2002 stating:  
The Area Support Groups in the Balkans, which have 
a role in contract oversight, are working to obtain an 
overview of all contractor activity. Until this task is 
completed, no one in DOD will know (1) how many 
contractors are located in the Balkans, (2) what the 
contractors have been contracted to do, and (3) the 
government’s obligations to the contractors under their 
contracts. The Area Support Groups’ task has been 
complicated because contractors sometimes decline to 
provide them with needed information and the Area Support 
. . . 194 
 
This report goes into the details of the inability of the military to 
monitor expenses in several regions that were engaged in the prewar 
buildup of 2002 at the time such as Army units in the Balkans and several 
airbases located in Saudi Arabia.  By this time, however, plans for the 
invasion of Iraq were well underway at the White House. While operation 
Enduring Freedom carried on in Afghanistan, combat operations in the 
neighboring country of Iraq were being planned by the Bush 
administration. These plans in no small part included a heavy PMC and 
PSC presence.  While PMFs did not have a major presence during the 
actual conflict, in post “mission accomplished”  Iraq, the rebuilding of the 
                                                 
193 Thomas E. White, Memorandum to Undersecretaries of Defense, March 8 , 2002 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/ArmyMemo1.pdf (accessed August 13, 2007) 
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country’s infrastructure has been carried out by PMFs almost exclusively. 
195   
The Iraq War 
The war in Iraq has brought PMFs into the spotlight.  In 2004, 
rumors of prisoner abuse at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison facility began 
to circulate in the popular press.  At one point Saddam Hussein’s 
government was holding over 50,000 Iraqi prisoners in a facility that 
came to symbolize the tyranny of his brutal government.  Torture and 
weekly executions were the norm during the regime’s reign.  After the U.S. 
liberation and subsequent occupation of Iraq, the facility was taken over 
by coalition authorities and designated a holding facility for detainees.  
Abu Ghraib was rebuilt in the wake of heavy looting and was considered a 
model facility for the coalition.  However when the CBS “60 Minutes II” 
report was aired in April of 2004  followed by  the publishing of an expose 
article in the New Yorker in May of 2004, the darker nature of the 
activities at Abu Ghraib became public record.196  Pictures of a horrifyingly 
graphic nature soon followed, with the image of a man named Satar Jabar 
hooded and standing on a box with wires hanging off of his fingers and 
penis (known derisively amongst Iraqis as the “Statue of 
                                                 
195 “Mission Accomplished” was a phrase placed on a banner behind President Bush while declaring the end 
of major combat operations in Iraq aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1st, 2003. While it was the end 
of major combat operations, the majority of deaths that have occurred in Iraq amongst both military and 
civilians has been post May 1st.  
19660 Minutes II “Abuse of Iraqi POWS By GIs Probed” CBS News, April 28, 2004. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (accessed August 18, 2007); 
Seymour M Hirsh. “Torture At Abu Ghraib” New Yorker, May 10, 2004. 
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Liberty”)becoming the de facto symbol of the scandal.197  A total of 17 
military personnel, including Brigadier General Janis Karpinski who was 
demoted to the rank of Colonel, were removed from active duty in the 
wake of the scandal. 198  Seven of the soldiers involved were court-
martialed, received dishonorable discharges, and were sentenced to 
federal prison for the abuses.  This, however, does not address the role of 
civilian contractors in the scandal.  As the scandal unfolded it was found 
that contractors employed by Titan and CACI were given great leeway and 
little in the way of direct supervision.  An investigation conducted by 
Lieutnent General Antonio Taguba resulted in a report called “ARTICLE 
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE.”199  
The report, ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Joint 
Task Force-7 and the senior U.S. military official in Iraq, stated that:  
(U) In general, U.S. civilian contract personnel (Titan 
Corporation, CACI, etc…), third country nationals, and local 
contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within 
the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site 
inspection, they wandered about with too much 
unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having 
civilians in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about 
the detainee area causes confusion and may have 
contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process 
and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness 
Statements, and the Personal Observations of the 
Investigation Team) 200 
 
                                                 
197 Julie Scelfo & Rod Nordland “Beneath the Hood” MSNBC.com. July 19, 2006 , Newsweek,  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5412316/site/newsweek/ (accessed August 18, 2007); According to the 
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 An earlier report issued by Major General Donald Ryder stated that 
members of the 205th  Military Intelligence  Brigade (MI) and the private 
contractors ordered members of the 372nd Military Police company in the  
800th Military Police Brigade to “set favorable conditions for subsequent 
interviews” which could be seen  as code for break the prisoners will. 201  
The pictures seem to indicate that this was the direction the MPs took.  
This is also indicated in the Taguba report with the following statements 
made by one the suspects in the investigation named SGT Javal S. Davis: 
 
      SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to 
the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said 
he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us’, ‘Make sure he has a 
bad night.’, ‘Make sure he gets the treatment. (emphasis 
added)’ 202  
 
 
As of April of 2006 no employees of CACI had been in indicted on 
any charges.203  However, three employees of CACI and three  employees 
of Titan were named in a report issued by Lieutenant General Anthony R. 
Jones and Major General George R. Fay known as the Jones Fay 
Report.204  This report focused more specifically on the 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade and its activities in collusion with both CACI and 
Titan.  The activities outlined in the report were of an incredibly brutal 
                                                 
201 Torture at Abu Ghraib . 
202 Article 15-6, pg. 18  
203 CACI website. “CACI in Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions”, http://www.caci.com/iraq_faqs.shtml 
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204 LTG Anthony R. Jones , MG George R. Fay. AR 15-6 Investigation Of the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 
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nature.  Prisoners were beaten, raped, and tortured both physically and 
mentally.  In an article written by Peter W. Singer for the Washington 
Post, the author claims that CACI hired interrogators with less than stellar 
qualifications: 
 
They (former CACI employees) asserted that in the 
rush to fill the billable interrogator jobs, the firm had 
conducted five-minute phone interviews with applicants and 
hadn't bothered to check their résumés, fingerprints or 
criminal records. The firm denied this, but the Army 
investigators found that 35 percent of the contract 
interrogators "lacked formal military training as 
interrogators.205      
 
As CACI was under contract with the Department of the Interior and Titan 
contracted with the CIA, the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not 
apply nor does the Military Extraterritorial Judicial Act of 2000.206  MEJA 
is interpreted as to apply only to military contractors and not those 
employed by other government agencies such as the Department of the 
Interior or the CIA.  DoD lawyers were quoted in 2000 as saying: 
 
 
. . . the inability of U.S. authorities to adequately respond to 
serious misconduct by civilians presents the strong potential 
for embarrassment in the international community, 
increases the possibility of hostility in the host nation's local 
community where our forces are assigned, and threatens 
relationships with our allies.207 
 
                                                 
205 Peter W.  Singer “The Contract the Military Needs to Break” Washington Post, September 13, 2004, 
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 Not all legal recourse has been refused, however.  Lawsuits have 
been filed against CACI and Titan, in particular Saleh vs. Titan was filed in 
September of 2004 by the New York based Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR) in relation to Abu Ghraib. 208  CCR has used the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) (known also as the Alien Tort Claims Act) established in 
1789 under the Judiciary Act as well as the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act of 1970 to bring suit against CACI and 
Titan.209  While neither act was originally created to prosecute corporate   
malfeasance (the ATS was initially used to combat piracy and RICO in the 
fight against organized crime), the combination of the two acts are being 
utilized in Saleh vs. Titan and Ibrahim vs. Titan to show responsibility on 
the part of Titan and CACI for the acts of the contractors.210  The ATS was 
used to some success in the late 1990’s to prosecute the Unocal 
Corporation for their support of Burmese soldiers’ use of conscription of 
local villagers to work in their plants. 211  However, Titan has claimed that 
they carry no responsibility as they were acting under the direction of the 
U.S. government. Valerie C. Charles explains it as such: 
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PMCs argue that no claims exist under the ATS 
against private companies when they are acting under the 
control of the United States in support, whether direct or 
indirect, of combat operations during wartime. Essentially, 
parties contracting with the United States government 
contend that because they are simply adhering to the 
specifications of a contractual agreement with the 
government, they are entitled to immunity that springs out 
of this contractual relationship.212   
 
  
 As of the summer of 2007 no action has been taken against Titan or 
CACI nor against any employees named in the suits.  It is ironic that the 
soldiers involved in the scandal at Abu Ghraib have been tried, court-
martialed, and sentenced while the perceived “supervisors” of the 
operations who through benign neglect at best have faced no charges for 
the monstrous images released from Abu Ghraib.  As Charles states, 
parties contracting with the United States are immune from prosecution 
because they are simply adhering to the specifics of the contract.  
 How is it possible that employees of a corporation could 
commit such acts and not face any legal repercussions?  The answer can be 
in part found in an order issued by L Paul Bremer on June 27, 2004 
known as Order #17.213  The order covers the conduct of what is referred to 
in the order as Multi-National Forces and Personnel.  This designation 
                                                 
212 Valerie C. Charles. 2005. “HIRED GUNS AND HIGHER LAW: A Tortured Expansion of the Military 
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covers all UN forces as well as civilian contractors.  The order in essence 
states that these personnel are immune from prosecution: 
 
 
3) All MNF, CPA and Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel, 
and International Consultants shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of their Sending States. They shall be 
immune from any form of arrest or detention other than by 
persons acting on behalf of their Sending States, except that 
nothing in this provision shall prohibit MNF Personnel from 
preventing acts of serious misconduct by the above-
mentioned Personnel or Consultants, or otherwise 
temporarily detaining any such Personnel or consultants 
who pose a risk of injury to themselves or others, pending 
expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of the 
Sending State.214    
 
 
 While this section of order #17 does not give the PMFs carte 
blanche, it allows the PMF extremely wide latitude to carry out its task.  
For example, an accepted part of the personal security detail (PSD) is 
warning shots. Vehicles that approach too close to a security convoy are 
first waved off, then warning shots are fired in front of the car, and finally 
the engine block and possibly the driver are incapacitated.  Statistics are 
not kept by the Pentagon or by the Iraqis, however, in the early part of 
2006 the Pentagon released 400 serious incident reports.215  This does not 
include the numerous incidents that were not reported during this period 
of time.  Young Pelton explains about his time riding with PSDs in Iraq:  
“During my time with contractors in Iraq, I never saw a single report filed, 
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even though gunfire against civilians was an everyday occurrence, with an 
average of three to six warning shots.”216   
It is understandable that PSDs use this action as a tool to prevent 
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) from detonating 
anywhere near the convoys.  However, the lack of accountability allows for 
incidents to occur that are never reported and have the backing of 
Order#17 while being carried out. And with little legal recourse within a 
shattered Iraqi legal system, the call to further violence from anti-
occupation groups cannot be too far behind. 
The content of Order #17 has recently come under attack by the 
Iraqi government due to a massive shooting incident on September 16, 
2007.  Seventeen civilians were killed as well as 24 injured during a 
shooting that took place in Nisour square in western Baghdad.  Multiple 
reports have been issued on the incident, including ones by the Iraqi 
government, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Each report, with the exception of the 
State Department report, points to Blackwater as the initiator of the 
shootings.  As the Personal Security Detail were transporting members of 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) An 
errant vehicle traveling the wrong way down the street was spotted by the 
escorts and warning shots were fired. After the vehicle did not stop, lethal 
force was used by the Blackwater team, killing a mother and her son. 
Details of how the actual event occurred vary from report to report.  For 
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example, the State Department report indicated that the detail was 
“engaged with small arms fire from several locations" but was  not 
mentioned in any other  report.217  In fact, the F.B.I. report indicated that 
14 of the 17 killings were unprovoked, while the Department of Defense 
report stated that all 17 were unjustified and excessive in nature with one 
DoD official saying, “The civilians that were fired upon, they didn't have 
any weapons to fire back at them.  And none of the IP (Iraqi police) or any 
of the local security forces fired back at them."218  In the aftermath of the 
shooting incident, the Iraqi government temporarily suspended the 
activities of Blackwater.  This meant that diplomats were not able to travel 
outside of the green zone during this suspension.  The State Department 
relies so heavily on Blackwater to provide security to the diplomats, that 
government business had to be halted for seven days as outrage from the 
incident settled.  The incident illustrates the darker nature of using PSCs 
as replacements for government agents.   
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Conclusion 
In examining many aspects of PMFs the unfortunate phrase of 
“unaccountability” has become most associated with the activities of the 
PMFs .  Their existence within a legal limbo creates a permissive 
environment where rules are bent to fit the situation.  While some rules 
must be interpreted to fit the new business entity of the PMF into the 
world market for security, the seemingly purposeful exploitation of gray 
areas in international treaty and law, combined with flimsy oversight has 
made the PMF less about the business of Private Military Firms and more 
about dodgy interpretation of the law and an unneeded reputation as 
thuggish bullies.   
The Private Military Firm stands at the crossroads of a unique point 
in history.  The world is starting to become interconnected not just in an 
economic and business sense, but a social and political one as well. Hedly 
Bull first used the phrase “ne0-medievalism” in 1977 in his essay entitled 
“The Anarchial Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.”  While 
Globalization is used in general to reference the economic benefits of 
interconnected global markets, neo-medievalism is seen as a way to 
describe the social and political aspects of this process.  Philip G. Cerny 
describes neo-medievalism: 
We are increasingly in the presence of a plurality of 
overlapping, competing, and intersecting power structures- 
institutions, political processes economic developments and 
social transformations- above, below, and cutting across 
states and state systems. 219  
                                                 
219 Philip G. Cerny. “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma”. Naval War College Review. Winter 2005 
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Cerny says that the states have responded to this evolution by 
developing quasi-public/private regimes that “seek to arbitrate competing 
claims for rights and privileges.”220  PMC/PSCs can be seen as a result of 
these quasi-public private regimes.  As globalization places more power 
into the hands of private interests, the state will further relinquish its 
monopoly on violence. For example, a Chinese company has signed a 
contract with Angola to provide 850,000 armed and unarmed PMCs for 
the use of that country.221  This was followed closely by a 10-year contract 
in which the Angolan government would be providing oil to China at the 
fixed rate of $60 a barrel.222  Had China given the Angolans that number 
of state forces, there would be global outrage, as a force that size would 
most definitely be seen as  occupiers.  However, this move by the Chinese 
and Angolan governments has not even entered into the realm of public 
discourse, due to the use of PMCs.   
This is followed by vital knowledge organizations being slowly 
removed from state forces and placed into privatized units. While Erik 
Prince rightly claims to be a patriot due to his  military service, his 
establishment of Greystone Ltd. is an expansion in the direction of the 
private military company as opposed to just the private security company.  
This new branch of Blackwater has been marketed as “an international 
supplier of turn-key security solutions. Greystone focuses on providing 
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stability to locations experiencing turmoil whether caused by armed 
conflict, epidemics, or natural or man-made disasters.”223  The problems 
the  Greystone website is discussing are generally issues dealt with by the 
state.  However, as Greystone evolves, the benefit it provides both the 
industry and the state will be tempered by the unforeseen hollowing out of 
an important tool of the state military.   
Finally as weak states create more and more situations where the 
intervention of strong states is needed, and the political will to send 
soldiers from the strong states wanes, the solutions that the MPF provide 
will give short-term profit (in an economic, political, and social sense) to 
the strong states.  The Private Military Firm will flourish as perceived 
insecurity grips society.  Without strict regulation and oversight by states 
and agreed upon international regimes of a higher consequence than self-
monitoring, this industry has the means to create not only more instability 
in the world but to become a force of instability unto itself.  One need only 
look at the Angola/China alliance to see that not all nations have conceived 
of this instrument as a wholesome one.  
The true power of the PMF is being recognized by members of 
congress in the U.S. with incidents such as Fallujah, Abu Ghraib,  and 
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Nisoor Square revealing a darker aspect to the PMFs that the public—and 
congress itself—was unaware of. With representatives such as  Jan 
Schakowsky of Illinois and Henry Waxman of California leading the 
charge, more awareness of the enmeshed nature of the U.S. government 
and the privatized military industry are occurring through hearings and 
reports such as Rep. Waxman’s Oct 2, 2007 hearings   on the activities of 
Blackwater where Waxman directly questioned Erik Prince on 
Blackwater’s role in the September 16th shootings in Nisoor square. This 
was preceded by a report issued the day before citing a staggering 195 
documented shooting incidents, averaging 1.4 a week since 2005.224  As 
such information slowly presents itself over the coming years, states as 
well as MPFs must come together and understand their somber 
responsibility in the world and work to establish a common ground for 
both the state and the citizens within it.   
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